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There is widespread belief that the Patent Office issues too many 
“bad” patents that impose significant harms on society. At first glance, 
the solution to the patent quality crisis seems straightforward: give 
patent examiners more time to review applications so that they grant 
patents only to those inventions that deserve them. Yet the answer to the 
harms of invalid patents may not be that easy. It is possible that the 
Patent Office is, as Mark Lemley famously wrote, “rationally ignorant.” 
In Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, Lemley argued that because 
so few patents are economically significant, it makes sense to rely on 
litigation to make detailed validity determinations in those rare cases 
rather than increase the expenses associated with conducting a more 
thorough review of all patent applications. He supported his thesis with 
a cost-benefit calculation in which he concluded that the costs of giving 
examiners more time outweigh the benefits of doing so.  
Given the import of the “rational ignorance” concept to the debate 
on how best to address bad patents, the time is ripe to revisit this 
discussion. This Article seeks to conduct a similar cost-benefit analysis 
to the one that Lemley attempted nearly fifteen years ago. In doing so, 
we employ new and rich sources of data along with sophisticated 
empirical techniques to form novel, empirically driven estimates of the 
relationships that Lemley was forced to assume in his own analysis 
given the dearth of empirical evidence at the time. Armed with these new 
estimates, this Article demonstrates that the savings in future litigation 
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and prosecution expenses associated with giving examiners additional 
time per application more than outweigh the costs of increasing 
examiner time allocations. Thus, we conclude the opposite of Lemley: 
society would be better off investing more resources in the Patent Office 
to improve patent quality than relying on ex post litigation to weed out 
invalid patents. Given its current level of resources, the Patent Office is 
not being “rationally ignorant” but, instead, irrationally ignorant.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The principal task of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 
(“Patent Office” or “Agency”) is to determine whether an invention 
merits a reward of a patent.1 There is growing consensus that the 
Patent Office is failing at this task.2 Many believe that the Agency 
allows too many “bad” patents that unnecessarily drain consumer 
welfare, stunt productive research, and unreasonably extract rents 
from innovators.3 The Patent Office’s overgranting tendencies have 
 
 1. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2017, at tbl.3 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
USPTOFY17PAR.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEQ7-9G2P] (noting the Patent Office’s mission includes 
“[f]ostering innovation . . . and . . . delivering high quality and timely examination of 
patent . . . applications”). We use the term “patent” in this Article to refer to utility patents. Utility 
patents protect the way an article is used and works. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents 
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”).  
 2. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (noting several ways in which the 
issuing of patents may harm innovation and industry); see also ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, 
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 7 (2004) (“We wrote this book because patent policy in the 
United States has gotten seriously off the rails, in ways that endanger the long-term well-being of 
our citizens.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5–7 (2003), http:///www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/ 
innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JBV-7GCW] (“Both competition and patent policy can foster 
innovation, but each requires a proper balance with the other to do so. Errors or systematic biases 
in how one policy’s rules are interpreted and applied can harm the other policy’s effectiveness.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 71, 87–88 (2013) (“Among patent scholars, there is almost unanimous agreement that patent 
examiners do not do their job particularly well, with the PTO issuing many invalid patents.”); 
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2001) 
(“The PTO has come under attack of late for failing to do a serious job of examining patents, thus 
allowing bad patents to slip through the system.”); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the 
Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 181 (2008) (“A growing chorus of voices is 
sounding a common refrain: the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is issuing far too many 
bad patents.”); Dough Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of 
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 n.5 (2007) (“Calls for patent reform have echoed loudly over the 
past several years, with industry organizations, patent scholars, and government agencies all 
publicly announcing that the patent system is broken and that the PTO in particular is letting a 
large number of undeserving patents be issued.”); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible 
Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589–91 (1999) (“The concerns about quality, especially in light of the 
data on overall volume, point to one conclusion: the patent system is in crisis. “); John R. Thomas, 
Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 305, 316–22 (“The patent quality crisis is worthy of our attention. The market impact of 
business method patents alone has yet to be quantitatively assessed, but decisions such as 
Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com suggest staggering possibilities.”); R. Polk Wagner, 
Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2139–45 (2009) (“The patent-
prosecution process is fraught with serious information problems of the sort that a robust 
marketplace might be able to resolve at least as well as an over-taxed administrative agency.”).  
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been the subject of multiple reports by the National Academies and the 
Federal Trade Commission.4 Patent quality concerns have energized 
the Supreme Court into taking a renewed interest in substantive patent 
law5 and driven Congress in 2011 to enact the first major patent reform 
act in nearly sixty years.6  
Although there is widespread agreement that invalid patents 
impose significant costs on society, there is little consensus as to how 
best to fix the patent system.7 At first glance, the solution seems 
straightforward: the Patent Office needs to do more to ensure it awards 
patents only to those inventions that deserve them. A seemingly 
promising start—and one that is at the forefront of current policy 
discussions8—is to give patent examiners more time to evaluate 
applications. On average, a U.S. patent examiner spends only eighteen 
hours reviewing an application,9 which includes reading the 
application, searching for prior art, comparing the prior art with the 
application, writing a rejection, responding to the patent applicant’s 
arguments, and often conducting an interview with the applicant’s 
attorney.10 If examiners are not given enough time to evaluate 
applications, they may not be able to reject applications by identifying 
and articulating justifications with appropriate underlying legal 
validity. Offering validation for these concerns, recent reports 
commissioned by the federal government bemoan that examiners 
 
 4. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen 
A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (discussing several issues with the patenting process); NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza 
eds., 2006) (recommending a higher standard for biotechnology patent qualification); see also FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2 (noting concerns for poor patent quality, legal standards, and 
procedures). 
 5. Lemley & Sampat, supra note 3, at 185 (“The unprecedented modern Supreme Court 
interest in patent cases and congressional interest in patent reform are both driven in part by the 
widespread perception that the PTO is acting as a rubber stamp, regularly issuing bad patents 
that wind up imposing costs on others.”). 
 6. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38, 40 (2011). 
 7. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 618–21 (2015) (summarizing the 
various explanations for the Patent Office’s perceived overgranting tendencies).  
 8. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 9. Online Appendix tbl.A2. The Online Appendix is available at 
https://vanderbiltlawreview.org/lawreview/2019/04/online-appendix-to-irrational-ignorance-at-
the-patent-office [https://perma.cc/D363-BPAJ]. 
 10. Because patent applications are presumed valid, if examiners are not able to conduct a 
sufficient search of prior art and articulate a proper basis of rejection over these hours, they are 
legally expected to allow the application. See Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 
97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 995–96 (2013) (“An applicant enjoys a presumption of patentability, which 
means that at the time of filing the application is rebuttably presumed to comply with the utility, 
novelty, nonobviousness, and disclosure requirements of the patent statute.”).  
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believe they are “fighting for their lives” and are “not [given] enough 
time to do a proper job.”11 Providing more systematic support, our prior 
empirical work tested the extent to which patent examiner time 
allocations are causing examiners to grant invalid patents and found 
that examiners were indeed granting patents of dubious quality 
because they are not given sufficient time to review patent 
applications.12 
Even in the face of this evidence, however, it is not immediately 
clear that the solution to the patent quality crisis is to give patent 
examiners more time. While increasing examiner time allocations will 
decrease the number of invalid patents issued by the Patent Office, it is 
possible that the Patent Office is, as Mark Lemley famously wrote, 
“rationally ignorant.”13 That is, it may be rational for the Patent Office 
not to screen patent applications too rigorously because there is another 
institutional player that could weed out bad patents: the courts.  
Mark Lemley’s seminal article on “rational ignorance” confronts 
a classic regulatory dilemma: Should society rely on an ex ante, 
administrative approach to substantive regulation—at a lower cost per 
unit but at a higher volume of activity—or should society instead 
regulate ex post via a litigation system—at a higher cost per unit but at 
a lower level of activity?14 In the case of patent validity determinations, 
Lemley favored the latter. He argued that because so few patents are 
litigated or licensed, it is better to rely on litigation to make detailed 
validity determinations in those rare instances rather than increasing 
the resources to the Patent Office to provide more thorough review of 
all patent applications.15 Lemley supported his thesis with a cost-
 
 11. MANHATTAN STRATEGY GRP., PATENT EXAMINERS PRODUCTION EXPECTANCY GOALS RE-
ASSESSMENT AND ADJUSTMENT STUDY, at D-9 (2010) (on file with author) (quoting patent 
examiners participating in a focus group).  
 12. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent 
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level 
Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 560 (2017), online appendix available at 
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00605/suppl_file/REST_a_00605-
esupp.pdf [https://perma.cc/R52Y-XKQV] (“Our analysis suggests that as time constraints tighten, 
examiners will grant some patents that they might have otherwise rejected if given sufficient 
time.”).  
 13. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1531 (“The PTO is rationally ignorant of the objective validity of 
the patents it examines.”).  
 14. For a discussion of this regulatory dilemma in other contexts, see, for example, Iman 
Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of 
Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75 (2013); Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 1715 (2015); and John D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Cost of Cigarettes: The 
Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998).  
 15. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1497 (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a 
competitor, it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few 
cases than to invest additional resources examining patents that will never be heard from again.”). 
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benefit analysis wherein he concluded that the costs associated with 
doubling the Patent Office’s hours to review patent applications 
outweighed the benefits gained by the resulting decrease in the number 
of invalid patents the Patent Office would issue.16 Although some of the 
numbers in his analysis reflect hard data, the dearth of empirical 
evidence available at the time forced him to make several critical 
assumptions, including assuming (rather than estimating) how many 
fewer patents the Patent Office would issue if examiner time allocations 
were doubled.17  
While it has been over fifteen years since Lemley wrote his 
important and widely cited article, the debate on how to best rid 
ourselves of bad patents continues to rage on. In 2011, Congress enacted 
the most comprehensive reform bill to the patent system in decades and 
arguably favored the ex post approach by creating a new adjudicatory 
tribunal at the Patent Office, wherein third parties can challenge the 
validity of issued patents.18 In 2016, for the first time in forty years, the 
Patent Office began a comprehensive reevaluation of examiner time 
allocations, arguably favoring an ex ante approach.19  
The time is ripe to revisit whether the Patent Office is, in fact, 
“rationally ignorant.” Should we increase the resources at the Patent 
Office in an effort to increase the quality of issued patents, or should we 
forego those marginal investments and reserve a larger residual role for 
the courts? This Article begins to answer this question by employing 
new and rich sources of data along with sophisticated empirical 
techniques to form novel, empirically driven estimates of the 
relationships that Lemley was forced to guess in his own analysis.  
Armed with these new estimates, this Article demonstrates that 
the savings in future litigation costs and prosecution expenses20 
associated with giving examiners additional time per application 
outweigh the costs of increasing examiner time allocations. The 
efficiency gains from marginal investments at the Patent Office are 
 
 16. Id. at 1508–10.  
 17. Id. at 1509.  
 18. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299–313 
(2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19, 321–29 (2012)) (post-grant review 
proceedings); id. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329–31 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012)) 
(providing for a transitional program for covered business method patents); id. § 10, 125 Stat. at 
316–20 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)) (providing for fee-setting authority); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40 (2011) (noting that the primary purpose of the America 
Invents Act is to “improve patent quality”). 
 19. Request for Comments on Examination Time Goals, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,383 (Oct. 25, 2016). 
Patent examiner time allocations have not been substantially modified since 1976. 
 20. Prosecution expenses are the costs related to interactions between the patent applicant 
and the Patent Office. 
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even greater when considering a range of additional harms that may 
ensue from the issuance of invalid patents by the Agency. We thus 
conclude the opposite of Lemley: society would be better off investing 
more resources into the Agency to improve patent quality than relying 
on ex post litigation to weed out invalid patents. Given its current level 
of resources, the Patent Office is not being “rationally ignorant” but, 
instead, irrationally ignorant.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a summary of 
our prior empirical work, which found that examiner time allocations 
were causing examiners to grant invalid patents. This Part concludes 
by briefly summarizing Lemley’s seminal article, Rational Ignorance at 
the Patent Office, highlighting its import in the debate of what to do 
about bad patents and noting three key assumptions he made in his 
cost-benefit analysis. Part II comprehensively sets forth the various 
social benefits associated with increasing the time examiners spend 
evaluating patent applications, and Part III comprehensively sets forth 
the various social costs associated with augmenting the time examiners 
have to review patent applications. In doing so, Parts II and III draw 
on empirical analyses to provide novel, rigorous estimates of the key 
relationships comprising this cost-benefit exercise. Part IV then 
compares the empirical estimates of the costs and savings associated 
with augmenting examiner time allocations to conclude that the Patent 
Office is—at least under its current resources—irrationally ignorant. 
Part IV also highlights the key differences between our findings and 
Lemley’s. We address possible objections in Part V. Finally, Part VI 
provides some specifics as to how the Patent Office should increase 
examiner time allocations.  
I. BACKGROUND 
This Article seeks to provide a take on the classic regulatory 
question: Should society increase the resources of the Patent Office to 
weed out bad patents, or should society instead reserve a larger residual 
role for the courts to invalidate improvidently granted patents? Our 
approach to this question is to evaluate the merits of increasing the 
Agency’s resources through a particular policy tool: augmenting the 
amount of time that patent examiners are given to review applications. 
Section I.A summarizes our prior findings that examiner time 
allocations induce examiners to grant patents of dubious quality. 
Section I.B summarizes Lemley’s seminal article, Rational Ignorance at 
the Patent Office, highlighting its import in the debate over what to do 
about bad patents as well as noting three critical assumptions he made 
in his cost-benefit analysis.  
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A. Increasing Time Allocations 
Why would extending examiners more time to review 
applications result in the Patent Office issuing fewer legally invalid 
patents? Patent applications are legally presumed to comply with the 
statutory patentability requirements when filed. As a result, a patent 
examiner that is not able to conduct a sufficient search of prior art and 
articulate a proper basis of rejection during their allotted review time 
is legally expected to allow the application.21 Thus, examiners who do 
not have enough time to properly evaluate applications are likely to 
grant invalid patents.  
Scholars and commentators have long believed that examiners 
are not given sufficient time to conduct a thorough and comprehensive 
analysis, though they had generally provided little evidence to support 
this assertion.22 To fill this gap, our prior research sought to move 
beyond anecdotal sentiments and empirically test the extent to which 
patent examiners’ time allocations cause them to grant invalid 
patents.23  
The Patent Office sets a patent examiner’s time allocation based 
on two key factors: the technological field in which the examiner is 
working and her position in the general schedule (“GS”) pay scale.24 A 
patent examiner in a more complex field is provided more hours to 
review an application than an examiner of the same GS-level who is 
working in a less complex field.25 The higher the pay grade of an 
examiner within a technology area, the fewer hours the Patent Office 
extends to that examiner.26 To demonstrate the degree to which time 
allocations scale with GS-level changes, we present in Table 1 the 
examination time expectations facing a patent examiner working in one 
of the most complex fields, artificial intelligence, and one of the least 
 
 21. Seymore, supra note 10, at 995–96.  
 22. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 550 (summarizing anecdotal evidence that patent 
examiners are time-crunched).  
 23. Id. 
 24. U.S. DEP’T COMM., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., USPTO SHOULD REASSESS HOW 
EXAMINER GOALS, PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLANS, AND THE AWARD SYSTEM STIMULATE  
AND REWARD EXAMINER PRODUCTION 7 n.6 (2004), https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/migrated/intelprop/109legis/CommerceDept_IGReportonPTO.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G94G-62T4] (“Expectancy goals vary among examiners and are based on the 
individual examiner’s grade level and the complexity of the technology under review.”).  
 25. Andy Faile, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Operations, Examination Time and the Production 
System, Presentation at the Santa Clara-Duke Quality Conference (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://1x937u16qcra1vnejt2hj4jl-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/Faile-
Examination-Time-and-the-Production-System.pptx [https://perma.cc/4S3N-GKDB]. 
 26. Id. 
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complex fields, compound tools (e.g., a hammer).27 A promotion to each 
subsequent pay grade is roughly equated to a 10% to 15% decrease in 
the number of allocated examination hours.28 Examiners operating at 
GS-level 7 are given the greatest amount of time in reviewing patents 
in compound tools and artificial intelligence—19.7 hours and 45.1 
hours, respectively—whereas examiners operating at GS-level 14 are 
expected to review the same patent in approximately half that time.  
In our recent research, we embraced the variation made possible 
by these schedules to test the link between examination time and the 
granting practices of examiners. More specifically, we followed 
individual examiners throughout the course of their careers and 
tracked the evolution of their examination behavior as they experienced 
GS-level promotions that diminished the amount of examination time 
at their disposal.29 Our methodological design was structured so as to 
explore this relationship between grant rates and the occurrence of 
time-allocation-reducing promotions while accounting for the 
potentially confounding influence of other factors—e.g., increases in 
examiner years of experience—that may be correlated with such 
promotions and that may independently affect examiner granting 
tendencies. Accordingly, in estimating this relationship between GS-
levels and grant rates, our underlying regression specifications 
included a series of fixed effects and other controls: (1) year fixed effects, 
based on the year in which the application is disposed of, to account for 
general Patent Office trends and granting practices; (2) examiner 
experience fixed effects (in two-year bins), to better isolate the time-
allocation aspect of GS-level promotions and account for the correlation 
between GS-levels and experience; (3) examiner fixed effects, to account 
for the possibility, among other things, that higher GS-level examiners 
have fundamentally different granting styles from their more junior 
counterparts; (4) technology-by-year fixed effects, to alleviate concerns 
that examiners may be reassigned to different technologies as they 
ascend to higher pay grades and that such reallocation schemes may 
change over time; and (5) various individual characteristics of the 
applications, including the entity size of the applicant (large versus 
small), the length of time between the filing and the disposition of the 
application, and the foreign priority status of the application (previous 
filings at the European Patent Office (“EPO”) and Japanese Patent 
Office (“JPO”). Our recent research also included various additional 
 
 27. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, HOW THE USPTO DETERMINES PRODUCTION FOR 
USPTO PATENT EXAMINERS (on file with author).  
 28. Id. at 1. 
 29. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 550. 
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empirical exercises to support the proposition that our methodological 
design captured variations in time allocations—e.g., we tested for and 
found stronger relationships in the case of time-sensitive bases of 
rejecting patent applications.30 
To execute our empirical strategy, we utilized novel data on 1.4 
million patent applications disposed of between 2002 and 2012, merged 
with rich, examiner roster data received from the Patent Office 
pursuant to a series of Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests.  
We found that as an examiner is given less time to review an 
application—as identified by these time-reducing promotions—the less 
active she becomes in searching for prior art, the less likely she becomes 
to make time-intensive rejections, and the more likely she becomes to 
grant the patent.31 The magnitude of the result is quite striking. A 
patent examiner who has been promoted to GS-level 14 has a grant rate 
that is 13% to 29% higher than it was when she was at a GS-level 7.32  
TABLE 1: EXAMINATION HOURS ALLOCATED TO EXAMINER AS A 
FUNCTION OF GS-LEVEL33 
 (1) (2) 
GS-level Compound Tools 
Artificial 
Intelligence 
GS-7 19.7 45.1 
GS-9 17.3 39.5 
GS-11 15.3 35.1 
GS-12 13.8 31.6 
GS-13 12.0 27.5 
GS-13, partial signatory 11.0 25.3 
GS-14 10.2 23.4 
 
In the Online Appendix, we update the analysis from this prior 
work to include five additional years of application data.34 We find 
nearly identical results. In the preferred empirical specification that we 
present, we find a roughly 27% (or 19 percentage-point) higher grant 
rate for an examiner at GS-level 14 relative to GS-level 7.35 Figure 1 
uses these updated results to plot the relationship between a given 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
33. Id. at online app. at 2–3 tbl.A1. 
34. See Online Appendix, supra note 9; see also Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12. 
35. See infra Figure 1.  
Wasserman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2019 3:13 PM 
2019] IRRATIONAL IGNORANCE 985 
examiner’s grant rate and the occurrence of each of the indicated GS-
level promotions, wherein GS-level 7 serves as the omitted reference 
group and wherein the indicated relationships partial out the influence 
of those other factors mentioned above (e.g., examiner experience-level 
bins).36 As Figure 1 demonstrates, examiner grant rates ascend strongly 
and monotonically with each GS-level promotion. In addition to the rich 
level of controls that we include in the regression design underlying this 
figure, the analysis also supports a causal interpretation of the observed 
pattern in light of certain institutional features of the Patent Office. 
Mainly because patent applications are randomly assigned to 
examiners within their technological groups, there is no reason to 
believe that examiners at higher GS-levels are being assigned more 
patent-worthy applications than examiners at lower GS-levels.37 
Our updated analysis implies that if examiners are given double 
the amount of time to review applications, the Patent Office’s overall 
grant rate would fall by roughly 19 percentage points, amounting to 
roughly eighty thousand fewer patents issued per year. What is the 
nature of these eighty thousand patents? Are they valid or invalid? If 
we were to expand time allocations so as to knock out patents, we would 
hope that the affected patents would indeed be invalid patents. 
Fortunately, our previous study was able to explore the nature of those 
patents issued on the margin as a result of binding time constraints.38 
To do so, we relied on the fact that many U.S. applicants likewise file 
for patent protection with the EPO and the JPO, two offices that are 
known to invest substantially more resources per application in the 
examination process while having essentially similar patentability 
standards.39 Accordingly, we considered the sample of issued patents in 
which the relevant U.S. applicant likewise sought protection at the EPO 
and the JPO and used outcomes at these foreign offices as a 
benchmark—albeit an imperfect one—to assess what the outcome at 
the U.S. Patent Office would have been (at least generally speaking) if 
the U.S. examiners were given more time and resources to determine 
 
 36. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 556. 
 37. A recent paper by Cesare Righi and Timothy Simcoe documents evidence of examiner 
specialization within technology-group assignments, as well as specialization within technology 
subgroups. Cesare Righi & Timothy Simcoe, Patent Examiner Specialization, 48 RES. POL’Y 137, 
141 (2019). However, Righi and Simcoe’s analysis finds “little evidence” suggesting that 
applications are assigned to examiners based on the importance or claim breadth of the 
applications or on their patent worthiness. Id. at 147.  
 38. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 553. 
 39. Pierre M. Picard & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Patent Office Governance and 
Patent System Quality, 104 J. PUB. ECON. 14, 16–17 (2013) (presenting “stylized facts on 
differences between the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the European Patent Office 
(EPO), and the Japan Patent Office (JPO)”). 
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the patentability of the relevant invention.40 We found evidence that 
the promotions of interest in our study were associated with a reduction 
in the frequency by which the inventors of U.S.-issued patents are 
successful in securing patent protection for the relevant inventions at 
the EPO and the JPO.41 The implication of this finding is that the 
marginal patents being issued as a result of binding time constraints 
are indeed of questionable legal validity. 
FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXAMINER GS-LEVELS AND GRANT 
RATE 
 
This Figure presents results from a regression of the incidence of a granted 
application on dummy variables representing each GS-level between 7 and 14. The 
dummy variable for GS-level 7 is omitted, representing the reference group. The 
vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients. The 
underlying regression producing this relationship accounts for fixed differences in 
granting practices across technology groups, across examiners, and across years, 
while also controlling for examiner experience levels. Further specifics are provided 
in the Online Appendix.42  
 
 40. To assess the quality of these marginal patent issuances, we consider the full sample of 
patents that were issued in the United States and also sought protection in the EPO and the JPO 
and then estimate how the mean incidence of such patents likewise being granted by the EPO 
(and/or the JPO) changes as examiners experience GS-level promotions that reduce the amount of 
examination time available to them. Consistent with expectations, we find that relative to the 
patents issued at GS-level 7, the patents issued at GS-level 14 are seven percentage points (or 
roughly sixteen percent) less likely to be allowed by both the EPO and the JPO (when using success 
at both foreign offices to signify the strongest benchmark of quality). Frakes & Wasserman, supra 
note 12, at 560. 
 41. Id. 
42. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 2–4. 
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In summary, our results from our prior research suggest that 
examiners are facing binding time constraints and that these time 
constraints are inducing examiners to grant invalid patents.43  
B. The Rationally Ignorant Patent Office 
Despite the existence of this compelling empirical evidence, it is 
not immediately clear that the solution to the patent quality crisis is to 
increase the time allocations of examiners. The Patent Office is not the 
only institution in the patent system that is capable of removing bad 
patents. Patent examiners, the adjudicatory board at the Patent Office, 
and the federal courts are all tasked with applying the patentability 
standards and assessing the validity of inventions seeking patent 
protection. In Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, Mark Lemley 
argued that it is rational for the Patent Office not to screen patent 
applications too rigorously.44 The key to his argument is that most bad 
patents are not economically significant because, like patents generally, 
few bad patents are litigated or licensed.45 Armed with this insight, he 
contended that litigation over a few economically valuable patents 
ex post may be more cost effective than a thorough examination of all 
patents ex ante.46 Despite the power of this conceptual observation, it 
is ultimately an empirical question whether the ex ante approach is in 
fact less cost effective than simply relying on the ex post litigation 
alternative.  
Lemley, recognizing this, attempted to support his “rational 
ignorance” contention with a cost-benefit analysis. During this 
calculation, he limited his consideration of costs and benefits to the 
following: private costs of prosecuting patents, annual returns of 
licensing patents, and total litigation costs.47 Lemley concluded that the 
costs associated with doubling the Patent Office’s hours to review 
patent applications outweigh the social benefits gained by the resulting 
decrease in the number of invalid patents the Patent Office would 
issue.48 Although some of the numbers in his analysis reflect hard data, 
empirical evidence on a number of the relationships important to his 
analysis was unavailable at that time. As a result, he was forced to 
 
 43. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 554–55. 
 44. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1496–97 (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a 
competitor, it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few 
cases than to invest additional resources examining patents that will never be heard from again.”).  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1496.  
 47. Id. at 1508–10. 
 48. Id. at 1508.  
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guess the magnitude of certain key parameters of this cost-benefit 
analysis, including the following:49  
• First, he assumed that doubling the time allocated to patent 
examiners would result in a ten percent drop in the number 
of invalidly issued patents.50  
• Second, he assumed that a ten percent drop in the number of 
improvidently issued patents would correspond with a 10% 
drop in litigation costs.51  
• Third, he assumed that doubling patent examiners’ time 
allocations would result in a fifty percent increase in the 
attorney’s cost of prosecuting a patent application.52  
The influence of Lemley’s contention that the Patent Office is, 
and ought to be, “rationally ignorant” is incontestable. Lemley is the 
most frequently cited scholar in the field of intellectual property53 and 
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office is his most cited article.54 Given 
the influence of the “rational ignorance” concept, it is unsurprising that 
we are not the first to revisit the idea. Perhaps most notably, Arti Rai 
has argued that while there is much to admire about Lemley’s article, 
it suffers from several limitations.55 Rai noted, as we do above, that 
Lemley’s cost-benefit analysis is based on “a few empirical assertions” 
and that he had to “assume” or “guess” critical relationships.56 She then 
cogently argued that the cost-benefit analysis of whether the time 
allocations of patent examiners should be increased should include a 
fuller account of the costs associated with the persistence of invalid 
patents—i.e., the benefits that would ensue from eliminating such 
patents—than Lemley set forth in his article.57 Shuba Ghosh and Jay 
 
 49. Id. at 1511.  
 50. Id. at 1508. 
 51. Id. at 1509. 
 52. Id. at 1508.  
 53. Brian Leiter, Ten Most-Cited Law Faculty in the United States for the Period of 2013-
2017, BRIAN LEITER’S L. SCH. REP. (Aug. 14, 2018), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/ 
leiter/2018/08/ten-most-cited-law-faculty-in-the-united-states-for-the-period-2013-2017.html 
[https://perma.cc/72AF-WCJS]. Mark Lemley is ranked fourth and also happens to be the only law 
professor included on the list who writes in intellectual property, as well as the youngest law 
professor included on the list. Id. 
 54. Mark Lemley, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=dF7HJ18 
AAAAJ&hl=en (last visited Apr. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/AP9Z-82EJ] (noting that Rational 
Ignorance at the Patent Office has received over 1,200 citations). 
 55. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System 
Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1081 (2003) (“Ultimately, however, the analysis suffers from 
several limitations.”).  
 56. Id. at 1080–81. 
 57. Id. at 1081–84. Rai also provides an interesting discussion on how post-grant proceedings 
could alter Lemley’s cost-benefit analysis. Given that Rai wrote her article in 2003, her discussion 
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Kesan have made a similar argument, delineating in detail the various 
costs of bad patents that Lemley did not include in his analysis.58 We 
agree with this contention and discuss how a broader spectrum of costs 
and benefits shapes and influences our analysis below. Notably, neither 
Rai nor Ghosh and Kesan attempted their own calculations to 
determine whether the social benefits of providing more resources to 
the Patent Office outweigh the social costs of doing so, noting the 
difficulties with such an endeavor.59  
Because the resolution of this debate ultimately rests on an 
empirical evaluation of the costs and benefits of investing more in 
ex ante examination review, this Article, similar to Lemley’s, confronts 
that cost-benefit exercise. Unlike Lemley, however, who had to guess 
each of the three above-mentioned critical relationships, we are able to 
provide empirically driven estimates of these relationships by utilizing 
rigorous empirical methodologies drawn from our own prior work and 
from that of others. Given the import of the “rational ignorance” concept 
on the debate surrounding how to increase patent quality, it is 
important to revisit the idea bringing to bear new empirical data and 
novel empirical methods to the concept. In doing so, we hope to provide 
a more accurate picture of the costs and benefits associated with 
increasing the resources of the Patent Office to weed out bad patents. 
The next Part begins this difficult task.  
II. SAVINGS ASSOCIATED WITH DECREASING THE ISSUANCE OF INVALID 
PATENTS 
Should we increase the resources of the Patent Office to help 
solve the patent quality crisis or rely on litigation to weed out bad 
patents? To answer this question, we want to know whether spending 
one dollar on increasing the resources at the Agency would save more 
than one dollar on the back end. That is, are the marginal benefits 
associated with allowing fewer invalid patents (due to the additional 
 
of post-grant proceedings assumes a structure like the European model—i.e., a continuation of the 
initial examination of patent application. This model, however, does not follow inter partes review 
procedures, which are the dominant mode of PTAB adjudication.  
 58. Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance 
in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1227 (2004). Ghosh and Kesan also argued that 
litigation would not perfectly eliminate all invalid patents. Id. at 1229. Ghosh and Kesan provide 
numerous reasons why invalid patents that are imposing harm on society may never be challenged 
in litigation. Id. at 1229–35. We see this argument as a corollary of their first point. To the extent 
that invalid patents will never be challenged in litigation, it is important to more fully understand 
the costs they impose on society. 
 59. Id. at 1228. Recognizing the difficulties associated with such a task and the lack of 
empirical data, Gosh and Kesan found that “it is difficult to quantify meaningfully the magnitude 
of the total social costs of bad patents.” Id. 
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dollar spent on Agency resources) greater than the marginal costs of 
providing examiners with more time to evaluate a patent application? 
If the answer is yes, then more savings are recouped than spent, and 
society should devote more resources to the Patent Office to increase 
the quality of examinations. If the answer is no, then society should not 
increase the resources to the Agency but instead continue to rely on 
litigation at its current level to weed out bad patents.  
To begin to tackle this calculation, the potential savings 
associated with increasing resources to the Patent Office and the costs 
associated with decreasing the number of invalid patents issued by the 
Agency must be understood. Before laying out the structure of this 
analysis, however, we note that while we desire to explore the returns 
to an additional dollar of spending at the Agency, our analysis below 
will actually evaluate the benefits arising from a larger marginal 
investment at the Patent Office. In order to make a direct comparison 
with Lemley, we will estimate the costs and benefits associated with a 
doubling of the amount of hours given to examiners, an investment in 
examination resources that surely exceeds one dollar. Nonetheless, we 
do not believe that our conclusion hinges on whether we approach this 
from the perspective of adding one more dollar to examination review 
or whether we envision doubling the time allotted for examination 
review. After all, in estimating the costs associated with doubling 
examination time, we conservatively assume some degree of overhead 
costs, hiring costs, and other costs associated with hiring and staffing 
more examiners. We would arguably not need to assume as many 
indirect costs of this nature if we just hypothesized adding a marginal 
dollar to examination review. In this case, whatever conclusion we 
reach as to the merits of more ex ante investment with a doubling-of-
hours approach should only generalize if we instead assessed the merits 
of a smaller, more marginal investment at the Patent Office. On the 
savings side, we confront this scaling concern somewhat directly with 
our empirical analysis. As discussed below, we find similar savings 
estimates whether we estimate empirical specifications that impose a 
linear relationship between time and litigation events or whether we 
estimate specifications that take a more nonparametric approach that 
does not assume any such linearity. Accordingly, when thinking about 
the savings side of our analysis, we also find no reason to believe that 
our results would not scale with the assumed size of the marginal 
investment in the Agency. 
This Part begins the cost-benefit calculation by sketching the 
savings associated with increasing the time an examiner spends 
reviewing a patent application. The potential savings from issuing 
fewer invalid patents are numerous. The harms associated with bad 
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patents include supracompetitive pricing (and the resulting reduction 
in access to the patented inventions),60 the preclusion of competitors 
from entering the affected markets,61 and the stunting of follow-on 
innovation.62 Invalid patents can also be utilized to opportunistically 
extract licensing fees from innovators,63 inhibit the ability of startups 
to obtain venture capital,64 impose wasteful litigation costs on society, 
and needlessly tax our already overburdened judiciary.65 
Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to quantify the vast majority of 
these harms with any certainty.  
As a result, this Part focuses on the potential savings associated 
with litigation savings, the benefit for which the most empirical data is 
available. It then considers whether doubling the time allocations of 
examiners results in decreasing prosecution expenses and concludes by 
considering other potential savings associated with doubling patent 
examiner time allocations.  
A. Litigation Savings 
This Section begins by outlining the litigation savings associated 
with doubling the time given to patent examiners to review 
applications. Determining the potential benefits associated with 
increasing Patent Office resources requires knowledge of the following 
 
 60. Not surprisingly, the patentability standards reflect a careful balance between 
encouraging innovation and drains on consumer welfare. In order for an invention to be patent 
eligible, it must be both new and represent a nontrivial advancement over the current state of the 
art. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2012). If an invention was obvious to the person of ordinary skill in the 
art or was already in the public domain, the invention would have likely arisen without the patent 
incentive. See id. § 103. In contrast, an invention that represents a significant advancement in the 
art may not have arisen but for the patent inducement. 
 61. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that allowing patents on obvious 
inventions can thwart competition); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of 
Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 119–25 (2006) (discussing the chilling effect 
invalid patents have on other potential innovators). 
 62. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 699 (1998); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on 
the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 32 (1991) 
(noting that overly broad patent protection “can lead to deficient incentives to develop second 
generation products”). 
 63. See Leslie, supra note 61, at 104. 
 64. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 8 (“The threat of being sued for infringement 
by an incumbent [patent holder]—even on a meritless claim—may ‘scare . . . away’ venture capital 
financing.” (quoting public comment of Joshua Lerner, Professor, Harvard Business School)). 
 65. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (“Dow alleged that Exxon had threatened to sue actual and prospective Dow customers for 
patent infringement, even though Exxon allegedly had no good-faith belief that Dow infringed the 
patent when Exxon made the threats and had allegedly obtained the patent by inequitable 
conduct.” (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1472, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); 
Leslie, supra note 61, at 125–27 (noting how further innovation may be stymied). 
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three pieces of information: (1) the costs associated with litigating 
patents, (2) how many fewer patents would be issued if the Patent Office 
increased the time allocations of examiners, and (3) the relationship 
between the amount of time extended to an examiner to review an 
application and the number of times any patent resulting from that 
application might one day become the subject of litigation. While 
Lemley was forced to guess these latter two relationships, we draw from 
sophisticated empirical methodologies to provide empirically driven 
estimates of them. In doing so, we hope to provide a more accurate 
picture of the savings associated with the Patent Office issuing fewer 
bad patents.  
Before proceeding to the details of our analysis, we should note 
that the simple ex ante versus ex post (that is, Agency versus courts) 
debate is more complicated now than in 2001, when Lemley wrote his 
seminal article. In 2012, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), 
which provides a court-like option at the Agency, was introduced into 
the patent system.66 More specifically, PTAB provides for a robust 
adjudicatory pathway in which third parties can challenge the issuance 
of a patent at the Patent Office.67 The analysis below incorporates 
consideration of PTAB into our cost-benefit calculation.  
This proceeds as follows. First, we provide a summary of patent-
litigation expenses in federal courts and in PTAB proceedings. Second, 
we delineate the theory of why increasing the time examiners review 
patent applications would lead to a savings in litigation costs. Third, we 
empirically estimate how much litigation savings in federal courts may 
ensue from a doubling of the amount of time allocated to examiners to 
review applications. Fourth, we repeat the exercises from Section II.A.3 
but focus on the litigation savings associated with PTAB adjudication.  
1. Background on Litigation Expenses 
Potentially substantial litigation savings may ensue by 
preventing invalid patents from issuing in the first place. After all, 
patent litigation in federal court is very expensive. The American 
Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) reports that when $10 
million to $25 million of damages are at risk, the median cost of patent 
litigation is $1 million for each side through the end of discovery and 
 
 66. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 7, 125 Stat. 284, 313–15 (2011); 
see also Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the 
PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1981–88 (2013) (describing the court-like aspects of these new 
proceedings).  
 67. See Wasserman, supra note 66, at 1981–88 (describing the procedural details associated 
with PTAB adjudication).  
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$2 million for each side through trial and appeal.68 These litigation 
costs scale upward and downward depending on the amount at risk. For 
instance, the median cost of patent litigation when more than $25 
million is at risk to each side is $1.7 million through the end of discovery 
and $3 million through trial and appeal.69  
Federal district courts, however, are no longer the only venue in 
which the validity of issued patents can be challenged. Since 2012, 
issued patents can also be challenged before PTAB.70 These new 
proceedings, which provide a robust pathway for third parties to 
challenge the validity of issued patents at the Agency, are supposed to 
provide a cost-effective alternative to challenging patents in federal 
courts.71 Reflecting this intention, these new proceedings share a host 
of features that mimic certain characteristics of a civil trial.72  
While Congress intended for PTAB to act as a substitute to 
federal district court litigation, suits may be brought in both venues; 
empirical evidence to date suggests that the overwhelming number of 
patents that are subject to a petition before PTAB are also subject to 
district court litigation.73 Although PTAB has proved a popular venue 
in which to challenge issued patents, the vast majority of patents whose 
validity is challenged are litigated only in Article III courts.74 The costs 
associated with challenging patents in a PTAB proceeding are 
significant, even though they are lower than the expenses associated 
with federal court litigation. The AIPLA reports the median cost of post-
grant proceedings before the Patent Office to each side is $200,000 
 
 68. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 41 (2017) 
[hereinafter AIPLA 2017 REPORT]. We acknowledge that there may be some noise in the AIPLA-
reported numbers, but we have no reason to believe that the AIPLA-reported numbers are biased 
in one direction or another. We also note that Mark Lemley also utilized AIPLA-reported numbers 
in his cost-benefit analysis. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1502. 
 69. AIPLA 2017 REPORT, supra note 68, at 41.  
 70. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 7.  
 71. The House Report on the America Invents Act (“AIA”) states that the Act intended to 
“convert[ ] inter partes reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding” while 
establishing a new agency procedure known as post-grant review that “would take place in a court-
like proceeding.” H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46, 68 (2011). 
 72. Wasserman, supra note 66, at 1981–88. Perhaps most saliently, the Patent Act requires 
these new administrative hearings to take place through an adversarial, court-like hearing in 
which parties are entitled to oral arguments and discovery. Id. 
 73. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual 
PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 81 (2016) (finding that seventy 
percent of patents associated with a petition before PTAB are also subject to federal court patent 
litigation).  
 74. Id. at 69 (finding approximately eighty-five percent of patents (11,787 out of 14,218 cases) 
whose validity are challenged are subject to federal district court litigation only).  
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through the end of motion practice, $250,000 through the PTAB 
hearing, and $350,000 through appeal.75  
Though these expenses are considerable, patent challenges—
whether brought in federal district court or PTAB proceedings—are 
relatively rare. Only roughly 17,000 of the issued patents in our sample 
of over 2.7 million over a sixteen-year period were asserted in federal 
court. Of course, even if ex post litigation is rare, meaningful savings 
could still be achieved from further embracing an ex ante approach if 
the amount of litigation that is forestalled in the process is large 
enough. Before addressing the empirical methodology underlying our 
attempt to determine the amount of litigation savings, this Article 
addresses why, conceptually, more investment at the examination stage 
may lead to less litigation in the first place.  
2. Why Greater Examination Scrutiny May Lead to  
Litigation Savings 
To begin this conceptual discussion, recall that the number of 
patents issued by the Patent Office may be expected to go down if 
examiners are given more time, as examiners may be better able to 
determine and articulate a basis to reject the invalid application. As 
discussed in Section I.A, we estimate that a doubling of the amount of 
time given to examiners will lower the Patent Office’s grant rate by 
roughly 27% (or by 19 percentage points).76 Importantly, our prior 
research also demonstrates that the forgone issuance of patents are 
likely of dubious quality. Considering the present level of application 
disposals per year, this suggests that upward of eighty-one thousand 
fewer patents would be allowed each year if examiners were given twice 
as much time to review applications. 
Now, why might we see litigation savings following these 
reductions in the number of patents issued? The first reason is perhaps 
self-evident: with fewer patents in issue, there is less opportunity for 
dispute to arise at all—whether based on infringement or validity. As 
such, we may see less litigation. Second, as discussed in Section I.A, 
because the patents that would cease to issue upon doubling examiner 
time allocations are likely to be of dubious quality, we may see a 
reduction in litigation to the extent that at least some patent litigation 
is driven by challenging the validity of low-quality patents. These may 
be lawsuits that would have otherwise commenced as declaratory 
judgment actions by non-patent holders wishing to invalidate another’s 
 
 75. AIPLA 2017 REPORT, supra note 68, at 51. 
76. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 2–4. 
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patents or as infringement actions by patent holders in the shadow of 
strong threats to file declaratory judgment actions by the non-patent 
holders. They may also represent lawsuits that would have otherwise 
been filed by a subset of non-practicing entities that have acquired a 
pool of low-quality patents and that seek nuisance settlements.77 
3. Empirical Investigation of the Link Between Examination  
Time Allocations and Litigation Savings 
Moving from theory to empirics, this Section seeks to estimate 
just how much litigation savings may ensue from doubling the amount 
of time allocated to examiners to review applications. To approach this 
question, we start by collecting data on individual patent applications 
from the Patent Office’s Patent Application Information Retrieval 
(“PAIR”) database, covering over 3.9 million utility patent applications 
filed on or after March 2001 and reaching a final disposition by May 
2017—i.e., excluding ongoing applications. Importantly, for each 
application, we possess information on the name of the examiner 
primarily charged with reviewing the application.78 To these data, we 
merge information on the future litigation (and PTAB) outcomes of 
those applications that culminate in patent issuance. For these 
purposes, we collected data on all patent lawsuits filed since January 
2001 from the Lex Machina database. We organize these data by patent 
number and determine the number of times each such patent is 
asserted in litigation. We do the same using data on PTAB filings that 
were graciously provided to us by Arti Rai and Jacob Sherkow. To these 
data, we also merge information on the GS-level of the associated 
examiner at the time of application disposition, which is necessary to 
determine the examiner’s time allocation. Information on the GS-level 
for each of the roughly twelve thousand examiners represented in our 
 
 77. This discussion has focused on litigation savings due to a reduction in the volume of 
issued patents, especially legally invalid patents. Theoretically, similar results may also arise from 
effects of time-allocation expansions on the scope of claims allowed by patent examiners. Imagine 
an application that an examiner would have allowed anyway, regardless of the time extended to 
her. With more time to review the application, the examiner may have further scrutinized the 
breadth of the claim scope sought by the applicant—e.g., she would have rejected a patent covering 
a flying car but would have allowed a patent covering a fusion-powered flying car. As the scope of 
claims issued by the Patent Office narrows, we may likewise see less litigation to the extent that 
some amount of litigation is also originated in part due to a desire to challenge the validity of 
patents in issue in light of the inappropriate scope of the claims (or originated in part to seek a 
nuisance settlement based on the assertion of a low-quality patent with excessive scope). 
 78. We treat the individual who did the majority of work on the application as the examiner 
charged with reviewing that application—the nonsignatory examiner, when both a nonsignatory 
and an examiner with signatory authority are associated with an application, or the signatory 
examiner, when only one examiner is associated with an application. 
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analytical file come from an examiner roster indicating GS-level 
promotion dates for each examiner, which we received pursuant to a 
FOIA request.  
With these data in place, we then seek to estimate empirical 
specifications capturing the relationship between the number of times 
that a given patent application is ultimately asserted in court (or in a 
PTAB proceeding) and the number of hours extended to the examiner 
to review the given application. This estimate will capture both of the 
theorized mechanisms regarding the link between time allocations and 
litigation savings: (1) reduced litigation due to the fact that time 
allocation expansions will decrease the overall number of issued 
patents and thus decrease the baseline probability of any dispute 
arising and (2) reduced litigation due to the fact that time allocation 
expansions will decrease the number of invalid patents that issue and 
thus decrease litigation activity that is specifically stimulated by the 
issuance of invalid patents. Since our goal is to understand how 
doubling time allocations for all examiners may lead to a reduction in 
overall litigation, we attempt to capture both such mechanisms by 
estimating the relationship in question using a sample of filed 
applications (as distinct from issued patents) as the baseline sample. 
To evaluate how examination time may affect litigation 
outcomes, it is necessary to draw on some degree of variation in 
examination time allotments. To understand where this variation 
comes from, remember that time allocations are a function of two 
factors: the examiner’s GS-level and the technology group in the Patent 
Office to which the examiner is assigned. Given this basic structure, we 
seek to determine how the litigation outcomes for the underlying 
applications change as examiners ascend through the GS scale. We 
capture this relationship by regressing the number of times the 
application is asserted in litigation on dummy variables for the different 
GS-levels—e.g., a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
associated examiner is at GS-level 7, a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether the examiner is at GS-level 9, and so forth. Specifically, given 
the rarity and count-like structure of the litigation outcomes (i.e., 
measures that take on integer levels greater than or equal to zero), we 
do not estimate Ordinary Least Squares regressions but instead 
estimate conditional negative binomial regression models. Within this 
regression framework, we include fixed effects for the technology group 
to which the examiner is assigned, such that we account for fixed 
differences in litigation frequencies across technologies. In essence, this 
approach compares litigation outcomes across GS-levels within a given 
technology group. Since time allocations are a function of GS-level and 
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technology, this forces us to focus on the variation in time allocations 
that arises solely through variation in GS-levels.79  
Of course, one may be concerned that changes in GS-levels may 
be correlated with other factors that likewise change over time and 
affect litigation outcomes, confounding any ability to suggest that the 
relationship we find between GS-levels and litigation rates can be 
attributed to time-allocation effects. It is thus important to account for 
as many such factors as possible. Accordingly, we also include a series 
of fixed effects for the following factors: (1) the year in which the 
application is disposed of, to account for changing litigation patterns 
over time, as the quality of the issued patent, and general economic 
conditions; (2) the experience level of the examiner (in two-year bins), 
to better isolate the time-allocation aspect of GS-level promotions and 
account for the correlation between GS-levels and experience (and thus 
account for the fact that issued patent quality may change with 
examiner experience for independent reasons);80 (3) the year in which 
the examiner joined the Patent Office, to account for changes in the 
conditions under which examiners were trained, which may have long-
lasting impacts on the quality of their reviews throughout their 
career;81 and (4) the ultimate tenure of the examiner at the Patent 
Office—i.e., the total number of years the relevant examiner ultimately 
spends with the Patent Office—to account for the fact that examiners 
that leave the Agency at different stages to pursue outside 
opportunities may differ in their fundamental examination quality. 82  
We focus our estimation sample on those patent applications 
that were disposed of prior to 2014. We exclude dispositions subsequent 
 
 79. If we were to try to identify the effect of hour allocations by isolating variations in time 
allotment across technology groups, it would be very difficult to separate the effect of time 
allotments themselves from differences in litigation (and other) outcomes due to the nature of the 
different technologies. We prefer instead to focus on exploring dynamics entirely within given 
technological groups.  
 80. We organize experience groups into two-year bins following the methodological insight of 
our previous research, Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at 550, given the perfect identity 
between hiring-year cohort effects, year effects, and experience effects that would otherwise occur 
if they were all grouped at the same level (i.e., experience = cohort + time).  
 81. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J. 1601, 
1602, 1605 (2016).  
 82. In Table 2, we do not include examiner fixed effects—i.e., do not account for fixed 
differences in litigation frequencies across every single examiner—because including examiner 
effects and technology-group fixed effects in a conditional negative binomial regression with over 
three million observations represents a rather cumbersome estimation exercise. Nonetheless, in 
our prior research on grant rates as the key outcome to be measured, we found that accounting for 
disposition year effects, examiner hiring year effects, examiner tenure effects, and examiner 
experience effects (all of which we include in the present Article) leads to estimates that are 
virtually identical to estimates that include examiner fixed effects. Frakes & Wasserman, supra 
note 12, online app. at 8. 
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to this point as there is generally a notable gap in time between when 
patents issue and when we observe assertions in federal court. Since 
the goal of the analysis is to understand what determines federal court 
outcomes, we do not wish to attenuate our results by including a set of 
applications for which there is not sufficient time to observe litigation 
outcomes. This brings the size of the analytical regression sample down 
to roughly 2.6 million applications. Nonetheless, we stress that the 
regression results are virtually identical when we instead include all 
3.9 million applications, including those disposed of from 2014 to 2017. 
To be clear, this restriction of excluding applications disposed of after 
2014 relates only to the sample of applications whose time allocations 
we are evaluating. For the litigation outcomes, we are continuing to use 
data as near to the present as possible. In this way we are, for instance, 
including applications disposed of in 2013 to see if they are litigated by 
2017.83  
We present the results of this exercise in Column 1 of Table 2. 
The reported coefficients are to be interpreted as incidence rate ratios 
(“IRR”). For instance, the estimated IRR of 1.26 for the GS-level 9 
coefficient suggests that the applications reviewed by GS-level 9 
examiners are litigated at 1.26 times the rate of applications reviewed 
by the reference group—i.e., GS-level 7 examiners. In other words, the 
GS-level 9 applications are litigated at a 26% higher rate. Importantly, 
we find that the degree of litigation rises monotonically with GS-level, 
suggesting that litigation becomes more likely the more that 
examination times are cut by the Patent Office. For purposes of this 
Article, this pattern of results suggests that litigation becomes less 
likely as examination times are expanded.  
As noted above, to facilitate a comparison of our analysis with 
that of Lemley’s, we examine the litigation savings stemming from 
doubling the examination time allotments. Considering that 
examination time falls by almost exactly half as examiners ascend from 
GS-level 7 to GS-level 14, comparing the litigation outcomes between 
these two levels provides us with an opportunity to explore the effect of 
cutting—or doubling, when considering the relationship in reverse—the 
assigned examination time in half. Given that GS-level 7 is the 
reference category in Table 2, it is relatively straightforward to make 
this comparison—that is, to simply observe the estimated coefficient of 
the GS-level 14 dummy. Doing so suggests that if examination time is 
cut in half, the number of times an application is ultimately asserted in 
 
 83. For the reasons that we discuss in the Online Appendix, we drop GS-level 5 and GS-
level 15 examiners from our analysis, though we note that this decision has little to no bearing on 
our results and the conclusions we reach. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 3. 
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litigation increases by roughly 78%, as suggested by the IRR of 1.78. If 
we consider a move in the reverse direction—i.e., doubling the amount 
of examination time—an IRR of 1.78 suggests that moving from GS-
level 14 to GS-level 7 hours brings the incidence rate from a normalized 
rate of 1.78 to the reference rate of 1.0, representing a roughly 44% 
decrease in the incidence rate. In other words, by doubling the amount 
of examination time, we may expect to observe a 44% reduction in the 
rate that an application will be expected to result in a patent that is 
asserted in litigation (relative to the baseline mean).84 This may be due 
to the fact that the expansion in examination time leads to the issuance 
of fewer patents overall and fewer invalid patents in particular.85 
 
 84. In unreported regressions, we also estimate specifications where we limit the sample to 
issued patents. In this alternative approach, we estimate a similar pattern of increasing rates of 
litigation as examiners ascend GS-levels. This implies that the results from Table 2 may, in part, 
reflect a response to the second mechanism identified above. That is, we do not merely see more 
litigation as examination time decreases because there are more patents issued and thus more 
opportunities to litigate. We also find that those legally invalid patents being issued on the margin 
in connection with GS-level changes are more likely to be asserted in court relative to the average 
issued patent. In other words, our findings suggest that legally invalid patents do attract more 
litigation, in which case decreasing the number of legally invalid patents via enhanced time 
allocations to examiners may further reduce litigation frequencies. 
 85. Again, this may also be due to a response to increased time allocations in which examiners 
issue patents with narrower scopes. On a final note, this 44% estimate remains nearly the same 
when taking an alternative approach in which we simply assign a variable to each application 
equal to the number of hours allotted to the associated examiner based on the GS-level and 
technology group of that examiner. We then estimate the same negative binomial regression model 
as above but replace the series of GS-level dummy variables with this sample-hours variable. We 
leave this as a robustness exercise in that it is less flexible and more parametric than the preferred 
approach from Table 2 as it fits a linear hours relationship—e.g., it implicitly assumes, for 
instance, that a move from six to seven hours of time allocation will have the same impact as a 
move from thirty-two to thirty-three hours. Also, this approach will simulate the effect of 
increasing the number of hours allocated by the average hours allotment over our sample, 17.9 
hours, even though this will not represent a true doubling for above- and below-average hour 
allotment technology groups. The GS-level 7 and GS-level 14 comparison by design will simulate 
the effect of doubling hour allotments for all technology groups. Nonetheless, it is encouraging that 
these approaches yield similar results. 
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TABLE 2: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXAMINER GS-LEVELS AND THE 
NUMBER OF TIMES INDIVIDUAL APPLICATIONS ARE ASSERTED IN 
LITIGATION AND INSTITUTED IN PTAB PROCEEDINGS: NEGATIVE 
BINOMIAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
 (1) (2) 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Number of Times 
Ultimately Asserted in 
Litigation 
Dependent Variable: 
Number of Times 
Ultimately Instituted 
in PTAB Proceeding 
Incident Rate Ratios for:   
(Omitted: GS-7)   
GS-9 
 1.26** 
 (0.13) 
2.18 
(1.06) 
GS-11 
1.29*** 
(0.14) 
3.41*** 
(1.60) 
GS-12 
1.36*** 
(0.15) 
2.91** 
(1.38) 
GS-13 
1.59*** 
(0.17) 
3.12** 
(1.48) 
GS-14 
1.78*** 
(0.19) 
3.55*** 
(1.68) 
N             2,631,302 2,229,496 
Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered to 
correct for autocorrelation within given examiners over time. Each observation is a 
given application from the PAIR database that reached a final disposition and that 
was published in the PAIR records between March 2001 and December 2014. 
Litigation outcomes are tracked through 2017, however, and PTAB outcomes are 
tracked through March 2016. The underlying negative binomial regressions 
producing these relationships account for fixed differences in litigation (or PTAB) 
outcomes across technology groups and across year, while also controlling for the 
entity size of the applicant and a range of examiner characteristics: experience (at 
the time of application disposition), ultimate tenure at the Patent Office, and hiring 
year. Reported coefficients are to be interpreted as incidence rate ratios, as 
discussed in the main text. Further specifics are provided in the Online Appendix.  
This estimate allows us to turn to determining how much 
litigation savings may ensue from a doubling of examination time. For 
these purposes, we use information on the cost of patent litigation from 
the AIPLA, capturing costs associated with outside and local counsel; 
paralegal services; travel and living expenses; fees and costs for court 
reporters, copies, couriers, exhibit preparation, analytical testing, 
expert witnesses, and similar expenses. The AIPLA estimates are one-
sided only, in that they only use costs associated with defending a suit, 
thereby omitting costs associated with the parties asserting the 
underlying patents. For the total savings estimates that we present, 
however, we assume that the plaintiff costs match those of the defense. 
Supporting this assumption, the 2015 AIPLA economic survey 
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indicated that a majority of survey respondents reported that assertion 
costs are the same as defense costs.86  
We present our estimated litigation-cost savings in Table 3. 
Column 1 acknowledges that, at the present, 430,056 utility patent 
applications are disposed of each year. The average number of times 
each application will culminate in a patent that is the subject of 
litigation at federal district court is 0.0129, in which event we predict 
that of these 430,056 disposals we will expect to observe roughly 5,561 
patent-lawsuit pairs, as reported in Column 2. We treat the outcome of 
interest as a patent-lawsuit pair, acknowledging that individual 
lawsuits may cover a group of patents. Next, we predict the reduction 
in the number of these patent-lawsuit pairs that is implied by the 
regression estimate from Table 2—i.e., a 44% reduction in the number 
of times a patent will be the subject of a lawsuit due to a doubling of 
examination time. Doing so, we anticipate observing 2,436 fewer 
patent-lawsuit pairs per year, as reported in Column 3. We then 
translate this amount into litigation savings per year.  
In the Online Appendix, we derive an estimate for the expected 
litigation costs associated with an average patent-lawsuit pair. For such 
purposes, we draw on data from several sources: (1) the annual Report 
of the Economic Survey from the AIPLA, which provides annual 
breakdowns of average litigation costs associated with cases, set forth 
by stages of litigation reached and by amounts at stake in the lawsuit; 
(2) a recent working paper by Christopher Cotropia and colleagues, A 
Granular Analysis of Civil Litigation,87 which, among things, assesses 
the distribution of case terminations across different stages of trial for 
sixteen thousand patent infringement lawsuits; and (3) data on patent 
infringement lawsuits from the Lex Machina database, including 
information on the resulting damages for those suits with damages 
awards. As explained in far greater depth in the Online Appendix, with 
these data, we derive the probability distribution associated with 
different types of lawsuits—consisting of different combinations of 
amounts at stake and the litigation stage at time of case termination—
along with the costs associated with litigating the relevant lawsuit 
type.88 With this distribution, we estimate that the total litigation costs 
associated with an average lawsuit is $539,949.89 To determine the 
average cost per patent-lawsuit pair, we divide this estimate by the 
 
 86. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 41 (2015). 
 87. Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, Kyle Rozema & David L. Schartz, A Granular 
Analysis of Civil Litigation (Aug. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).  
88. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 9–12. 
89. Id. at 11. 
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average number of patents that are included in each case filing over our 
sample period (2.3 years) to arrive at an estimated cost per patent-
lawsuit pair ($234,761).90 Considering the number of patent-lawsuit 
pairs that we predict will be eliminated by doubling examination hours, 
we predict that doubling examination time will be associated with a 
savings in future litigation expenses per year of roughly $572 million.91 
Because the litigation savings will occur in the future but the 
costs associated with doubling patent examiner time allocations and the 
patent prosecution legal savings occur immediately, the final step of our 
calculation will adjust the litigation savings to account for this 
difference in timing.92 Calculating the present value of future litigation 
savings requires two additional pieces of information: (1) how far into 
the future the litigation savings will materialize and (2) the appropriate 
discount rate. We obtain the first piece of information by calculating the 
age distribution of patents litigated. We find that on average patents 
experience their first litigation filing 3.1 years following the date of 
allowance. Of course, many of the patents over our sample period are 
litigated more than once. When considering the full distribution of 
litigated patents and the time to litigation for the second, third, etc. 
times that a patent is litigated, we find that the average patent 
litigation begins roughly 3.4 years following the date of allowance. We 
next acknowledge that not all litigation expenses are incurred at the 
time a lawsuit is filed. The bulk of litigation expenses accounted for in 
our estimate of the costs per patent-lawsuit pair are attributed to the 
expenses incurred up to the end of discovery or claim construction. 
According to the working paper by Cotropia and colleagues, this 
milestone occurs, on average, twenty-two months after the lawsuit is 
filed.93 Compiling this information, we thus envision that the expenses 
associated with the average patent-lawsuit pair will occur roughly 5.2 
years following the date of patent issuance.  
Next, we consider the appropriate discount rate. There is a 
growing literature considering the choice of discount rates in regulatory 
 
90. Id. at 11. 
91. We calculate this number by multiplying the estimated cost per patent-lawsuit pair of 
$234,761 by the number of 2,436 forgone patent-lawsuit pairs per year.  
 92. Technically, the increase in examination costs (and estimated reduction in prosecution 
expenses) are not all incurred simultaneously but are instead incurred over a period of time. To 
simplify matters, however, we elect not to discount these examination-related figures. Rather, we 
elect to start the clock, for discounting purposes, at the moment of time in which the relevant 
patents are issued. The key point for the purposes of this discussion is simply that the litigation 
savings will be incurred at a later period of time. 
 93. Cotropia et al., supra note 87 (manuscript at 18). 
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settings.94 If the Patent Office increases examiner time allocations, as 
discussed in Section III.A below, the Agency would likely cover these 
additional personnel expenses by increasing its fees. An increase in fees 
of this magnitude would be an “economically significant” regulation—
that is, the increase would be considered a rule that creates an economic 
impact of at least $100 million.95 This would require the Patent Office 
to perform a cost-benefit analysis similar to the one outlined in this 
Article.96 Therefore, we elect to utilize the discount rates suggested by 
the Office of Management and Budget of 3% and 7%, as the Patent 
Office would be required to do as well.97 Using a 3% discount rate and 
considering the average time to litigation, we find that the $572 million 
in annual litigation savings stated above is presently valued at $491 
million. If we were to use a 7% discount rate, this figure would fall to 
$402 million.  
Finally, how does the existence of PTAB, which came into effect 
in September 2012, complicate the analysis that relies on application 
and federal court litigation data from 2001 through 2017? To the extent 
that PTAB creates a substitute for the litigation of a patent’s validity 
in federal courts, one may be concerned that PTAB would dampen the 
relationship between examination time and the degree of litigation 
savings. As such, one may be concerned that we are overstating the 
degree of litigation savings as an ongoing matter by using litigation 
data from the entire post-2001 time period—over ten years of which the 
PTAB did not exist.98 
 
 94. See William J. Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 788 (1968); 
Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later 
Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993); Frank Partnoy, Corporations and 
Human Life, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 399 (2017); Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting 
Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171 (2007). 
 95. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 96. In 1981, President Reagan mandated by Executive Order that administrative agencies 
perform cost-benefit analysis for all economically significant regulations. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 
§ 2(d), 48 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194 (Feb. 19, 1982). This mandate has remained in force across 
every subsequent administration. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(a), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735 
(Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13,563, § 1, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (Obama). 
 97. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 30–31 (1991) 
(discussing the requirement to use a discount rate of three percent and seven percent).  
 98. At the outset of this discussion, we justify our choice of using the longer time period given 
the complexities of our empirical design. We are trying to trace out how litigation likelihoods (and 
patent grant rates) evolve as GS-levels of examiners change while also separating GS-level effects 
from general overall time trends in litigation rates, changes in experience levels of examiners, etc. 
This separation exercise requires notable temporal breadth in the data, limiting our ability to do 
so while only focusing on the most recent time period. It is also critical to use a long time period in 
light of the gap in years that often spans between patents issuing and being the subject of 
subsequent litigation. 
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TABLE 3: SIMULATED REDUCTION IN LITIGATION EXPENSES 
ASSOCIATED WITH DOUBLING AMOUNT OF TIME ALLOCATED  
TO EXAMINERS 
The number of applications disposed of by the Patent Office that is indicated in 
Column 1 is based on the number of dispositions of regular utility patent 
applications from the 2016 PAIR data. Expected litigation outcomes for these 
dispositions is based on the mean number of times an application is litigated in 
court based on the PAIR data merged with litigation data from the Lex Machina 
database. The estimated decrease in litigation events reported in Column 3 is 
derived from the results from Table 4. The litigation cost data that form the basis 
for the estimates in Column 4 are from the (AIPLA surveys, as discussed in further 
detail in the Online Appendix.   
To address this concern, we begin by examining whether PTAB 
is in fact a substitute for federal court litigation. At the onset, we note 
that preliminary evidence put forth by others tends to refute this 
substitution hypothesis. As noted above, the overwhelming number of 
patents that are subject to a petition before PTAB are also the subject 
of an action before a federal district court.99 Moreover, the vast majority 
of patents whose validity is challenged in any capacity are still only 
litigated in federal district court.100 In our own data, litigation rates 
appear to be comparable before and after the America Invents Act 
(“AIA”), which created PTAB, further cutting against the substitution 
hypothesis. More specifically, we find that the number of times a patent 
application ultimately becomes the subject of a federal lawsuit is 
slightly larger in the post-AIA period relative to the pre-AIA period.101  
 
 99. See Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 73, at 81. 
 100. Id. at 69.  
 101. To determine this, we compare the mean number of times that a patent application 
becomes the subject of a federal patent lawsuit filed during the four years following the AIA’s 
effective date—i.e., 2013 to 2016—with the mean number of times that a patent application 
becomes the subject of a federal patent lawsuit filed during the four years prior to the AIA’s 
passage—i.e., 2008 to 2011. This comparison is of course difficult given the time lag between when 
patents issue and when they are litigated, which means we do not necessarily want to limit 
ourselves to patent applications that were filed during those two windows. However, we also want 
to make sure to keep consistent across the comparison groups the length of time we observe 
applications so that we equalize exposure and lawsuit-filing opportunity periods across our two 
comparison groups. Accordingly, when determining the 2013 to 2016 litigation likelihood, we do so 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of 
Annual 
Reviews 
Completed 
by 
Examiners 
Expected Number 
of Federal Case-
Application Pairs 
Arising from 
Annual Reviews 
Estimated Decrease 
in Number of Patent 
Case-Application 
Pairs from Doubling 
Examination Hours 
Estimated Decrease 
in Litigation Costs 
from Doubling 
Examination Hours 
430,056 5,561 2,436 $571,876,758.10 
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To further address the concern that we overestimate litigation 
savings in light of PTAB’s creation in 2012, we assess whether our 
estimated relationship between time allocations and reduced litigation 
events is affected by the inclusion or exclusion of post-AIA data. We find 
that the removal of the post-AIA years from our sample has no effect on 
our estimates from Table 2 that a doubling of examination time 
allocations results in a 44% reduction in the number of times an 
application is ultimately the subject of a federal patent lawsuit.102  
Taken in tandem, these two findings—that is, more litigation 
events after the AIA and hours-litigation-rate estimates that are 
unaffected by the AIA—suggest that our federal court litigation savings 
analysis is unchanged by the introduction of PTAB.103 In fact, the 
 
while focusing on those applications disposed of by the Patent Office between 2009 and 2012—i.e., 
the four years leading up to the effective date of the AIA. And when determining the 2008 to 2011 
litigation likelihood, we do so while focusing on those applications disposed of by the Patent Office 
between 2004 and 2007—i.e., the four years leading up to the relevant litigation observation 
period. 
 More specifically, we find that the number of times a patent application ultimately becomes 
the subject of a federal lawsuit is larger in the post-AIA period (0.009) relative to the pre-AIA 
period (0.007). We do not mean to create any inference that the fundamental degree of litigiousness 
increased after the AIA based on this fact. Any such inference is not necessary for the point of this 
Article’s cost-benefit exercise. In fact, part of this increase in expected litigation outcomes may be 
attributable to the heightening of the joinder standard set forth in Section 299 of the AIA, which 
made it more difficult for plaintiffs to join multiple defendants in a single case. See 35 U.S.C.A. 
§ 299 (West 2019). We do not dispute the possibility that this joinder provision may have 
contributed to a higher than expected number of patent-lawsuit pairs arising from insufficient 
time allocations, but this does not undermine our analysis. On the contrary, it perhaps reinforces 
it. The arguable inefficiencies in this joinder reform may only heighten what is at stake in terms 
of the litigation costs stemming from examination time deficiencies and thus the savings that may 
arise in litigation expenses from giving examiners more time.  
 102. By “pre-AIA years,” we mean that we focus only on applications that were disposed of and 
lawsuits that were filed prior to the AIA being enacted. 
 103. Out of those fewer patent-lawsuit pairs that we predict will result each year as a result 
of doubling time allocations, it is likely that a small subset of these pairs will exist 
contemporaneously with ongoing PTAB challenges. We acknowledge that in this case the litigation 
costs associated with these pairs may be lower than the average costs that we calculate for a 
patent-lawsuit pair in the Online Appendix to the extent that the federal litigation itself may be 
stayed during the course of the PTAB proceedings. While this may mean that we are overstating 
our litigation savings, it is unlikely that we would be doing so by an extensive amount. To begin, 
only a small number of cases would be of this overlapping nature. As stated elsewhere in this 
Article, the expected number of times an application will be asserted in litigation is 0.0129, 
whereas the expected number of times an application will be the subject of a PTAB institution is 
0.00088. In other words, litigation is over fourteen times as likely as a PTAB institution. If we 
conservatively assume that all PTAB institutions are also the subject of litigation, this would still 
suggest that only 7% of the patent-lawsuit pairs are also the subject of a PTAB institution 
(0.00088 / 0.0129). Even if we further conservatively assume that the litigation costs associated 
with these 7% of cases are only half of the amount reported by the AIPLA for litigation expenses 
up to the point of case management, this would mean that our litigation savings would fall by only 
$31 million per year, down to a total of $540 million per year in savings.  
 There is even good reason to believe that the litigation savings would not fall down to $540 
million in light of stayed litigation. To arrive at the litigation-savings estimates reported in Table 
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introduction of PTAB only reinforces this Article’s conclusion that the 
savings from increased examination time justify the costs. After all, if 
increased examination time reduces the issuance of invalid patents, 
this may also lead to savings in PTAB-related legal expenses. In the 
following Section, we attempt to estimate such additional savings. 
4. Empirical Investigation of the Link Between Examination Time 
Allocations and PTAB Savings 
To investigate the amount of PTAB savings that may ensue from 
increasing examination time, we utilize the same methodological 
approach employed in the preceding Section but switch outcome 
variables. Instead of exploring how doubling examination time leads to 
a change in the number of times a patent application ultimately winds 
up in litigation, we explore how it leads to a change in the number of 
times an application ultimately winds up the subject of a PTAB 
proceeding.104  
Column 2 of Table 2 estimates the same specification estimated 
in Column 1 (which pertained to litigation frequencies) but replaces the 
 
3, we utilize patent-application data from the full post-2001 period. We do so as this enables a 
more reliable estimate of the amount of patent-lawsuit pairs that may be reduced by doubling 
patent examination hours given the cumbersome empirical task associated with separating the 
effects of GS-level changes from experience effects, annual changes in grant rates and litigation 
outcomes, and other factors. Nonetheless, if we really want to understand what the litigation 
savings are in the post-PTAB/post-AIA era in light of this concern over litigation stays in that 
small amount of cases with an overlap, we would arguably want to focus solely on post-AIA data 
in producing the total litigation savings estimate. It would seem inappropriate to fully discount 
the average annual savings we estimate using data from the post-2001 era by 7% when PTAB-
related stays only became relevant at the end of that period. As discussed above, when we 
reestimate the relationship between GS-level changes and litigation likelihoods focusing on post-
AIA data, our point estimates do not change. If anything, the underlying rate of litigation itself 
increases notably following the AIA—by as much as 25% relative to the mean—in which event we 
might predict a greater reduction in the number of patent-lawsuit pairs by focusing only on this 
recent data. Relatedly, the numbers of patents per case is lower in recent years, in which event 
the per-case amounts reported by the AIPLA (and that are key inputs to our calculations in the 
Online Appendix) would not need to be scaled down by as much as we are doing to produce Table 
3. All told, if we were to attempt to predict the amount of annual litigation savings from doubling 
examination hours just considering post-AIA years, the savings would likely exceed that reported 
in Table 3 by a percentage amount exceeding 7%. Accordingly, we see no reason to believe that the 
concern over stayed litigation arising in the post-AIA period (for overlap cases) will change the 
ultimate conclusion that we reach in this Article—i.e., that the savings associated with doubling 
examination hours will likely exceed the costs.  
 104. This exercise is likely to produce slightly noisier estimates for two reasons. First, as 
already discussed, PTAB is used less frequently than litigation. Second, even though patent 
applications filed throughout the sample period have implicated PTAB challenges, such challenges 
were only filed subsequent to September 2012, when PTAB became effective, unlike litigation, 
which was naturally an option all throughout the sample period. This only further reduces the 
mean incidence of PTAB over our sample of applications. With lower baseline rates, it presents a 
greater statistical challenge in estimating the impacts of GS-level changes on PTAB challenge 
frequencies.  
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outcome measure of interest, instead using the number of times the 
relevant patent application became the subject of a PTAB challenge up 
to March 2016, when our PTAB data ends. As with litigation outcomes, 
we continue to find that the number of times an application results in a 
patent that is the subject of a PTAB challenge rises as the amount of 
examination time associated with that application falls, as identified by 
changes in the GS-levels of the associated examiners.105 As before, the 
GS-level 14 coefficient—which is to be interpreted with reference to a 
GS-level 7 effect—provides us with a way to explore the effect of 
doubling examination time on PTAB events. The results imply that the 
normalized incidence rate of PTAB activity at GS-level 14 is roughly 
3.55 relative to the baseline incidence rate of 1.0 for GS-level 7. Moving 
examiners from GS-level 14 to GS-level 7 time allocations—i.e., 
doubling their time—would thus lead to a roughly 72% (2.55 / 3.55) 
reduction in the frequency of PTAB challenges.  
In Table 4, we consider what this reduction implies in terms of 
PTAB expense savings. Table 4 follows the same structure of Table 3 in 
the case of litigation savings. To understand the computation of the 
savings estimates in Column 4, first note that 430,056 utility patent 
applications are disposed of each year, as reported in Column 1. The 
average number of times these applications will culminate in a patent 
that becomes the subject of a PTAB challenge is 0.00088, in which event 
we predict that of those 430,056 disposals roughly 378 will be the 
subject of an instituted PTAB petition.106 By doubling examination 
time, we predict that this number will fall by 72%, or by 272 instituted 
PTAB challenges. To determine the total savings in PTAB-related 
litigation expenses stemming from this reduction in PTAB challenges, 
we multiply this amount by the average litigation costs associated with 
PTAB proceedings, which we likewise derive from the Annual Report of 
the Economic Survey of the AIPLA, as discussed in greater detail in the 
Online Appendix.107 All told, our analysis implies a considerable degree 
of savings—over $123 million. 
Similar to the litigation savings presented in Section II.A.3, we 
must account for the difference in time associated with the PTAB-
 
 105. This pattern is not perfectly monotonic, however. In general, PTAB frequencies rise with 
each iterative GS-level promotion, except that there is an especially high spike in PTAB 
frequencies for GS-level 11 applications. Again, however, some noise in this relationship is to be 
expected given the notable rarity in ultimate PTAB challenges over our entire sample of 
applications.  
 106.  This estimate is nearly unchanged when we instead consider the mean number of PTAB 
challenges over the full sample period, including applications disposed of all the way up until the 
last period for which we have data on PTAB challenges (March 2016). 
107. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 9–12. 
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related litigation savings. Unfortunately, it is not altogether 
straightforward how to go about determining the average time gap 
between patent issuance and the onset of PTAB proceedings, at least as 
a matter moving forward. The key difficulty in doing so is that PTAB 
proceedings did not begin until late 2012, in which event the gap 
between patent issuance and PTAB proceedings using data from our 
full sample period would provide a misleading sense of the true gap. 
Moreover, the difficulty with relying on patents issued in recent years 
is that the data is naturally truncated at the right end, likewise leaving 
an imperfect sense of the true gap between patent issuance and PTAB 
proceedings. To address these concerns, we simply focus on those 
patents issued in 2012. With this restriction, we find that the average 
time between patent issuance and the onset of PTAB proceedings is 2.1 
years. We assume that the bulk of the PTAB expenses associated with 
each PTAB challenge are incurred one year after the filing of a PTAB 
challenge. As such, we discount the $123 million in savings by 3.1 years, 
which, using a 3% discount rate, suggests an annual savings of $112 
million ($100 million if we were to use a 7% discount rate).  
TABLE 4: SIMULATED REDUCTION IN PTAB EXPENSES ASSOCIATED 
WITH DOUBLING AMOUNT OF TIME ALLOCATED TO EXAMINERS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of 
Annual 
Reviews 
Completed 
by 
Examiners 
Expected 
Number of 
PTAB 
Challenges 
Arising from 
Annual Reviews 
Estimated 
Decrease in 
Number of PTAB 
Challenges from 
Doubling 
Examination Hours  
Estimated 
Decrease in PTAB 
Challenge Costs 
from Doubling 
Examination 
Hours 
430,056 378 272 $123,080,000 
The structure of this Table parallels that of Table 3. Data on PTAB challenge costs 
are likewise from the 2015 Annual Survey of the AIPLA. 
Finally, we emphasize that the estimates of PTAB litigation 
savings focus only on the costs of defending and bringing a PTAB 
challenge. They do not include the costs to the Patent Office itself in 
employing PTAB judges and associated staff. Conceivably, with a 
substantial reduction in PTAB challenges stemming from the 
hypothesized doubling of examination time, the Patent Office could 
save further personnel resources.  
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B. Possible Prosecution Savings to Patent Applicants 
The second possible savings associated with increasing 
examiner time allocations is a decrease in prosecution expenses to 
patent applicants.108 In contrast to the litigation savings above, it is 
theoretically ambiguous whether giving patent examiners more time 
will lead to a decrease in costs incurred by the prosecuting attorneys 
(and hence patent applicants).  
Increasing the time allocations of patent examiners could result 
in examiners making clearer and better thought out rejections, which 
in turn could enable the prosecuting attorney to either more quickly 
obtain a patent grant or determine that the application should be 
abandoned because it fails to meet the patentability standards. Because 
the patent examination process involves a back and forth between the 
patent examiner and the prosecuting attorney, it is possible that 
improved examination could decrease the number of rounds of review 
at the Patent Office, resulting in a financial savings to the patent 
applicant. Our prior empirical work lends some support to the 
contention that if a patent examiner makes an initial low-quality 
rejection, which our evidence suggests examiners often do under time 
pressures near deadlines, this low-quality rejection will increase the 
time an application is under review at the Patent Office and result in 
additional rounds of review.109 In short, when examiners make quick, 
low-quality rejections in early rounds of review in order to meet 
deadlines—rejections that are nonfinal in nature—they will need to 
make up for these initial low-quality rejections in later rounds. The 
implication is that time pressures may cause examiners to waste 
rounds of review.  
On the other hand, increasing the time allocations of patent 
examiners is likely to result in a more rigorous examination in which 
better, more comprehensive rejections are made. It is possible that as 
the quality of examination increases, it will require prosecuting 
attorneys to spend more time responding to these rejections, which may 
generate added social costs not potential savings. This may be 
especially true if patent examiners begin making more complicated or 
 
 108. This Section concludes that doubling examiner time allocations results in potential 
savings rather than increased patent prosecution expenses. Nevertheless, we elect to discuss the 
effect of increasing examiner time allocations on patent prosecution expenses in Section II.B 
because, as discussed above, the theoretical relationship is unclear and because Lemley believed 
they were a cost. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1497.  
 109. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Procrastination in the Workplace: Evidence 
from the U.S. Patent Office 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24159, 2018). 
In the Online Appendix, we spell out in greater detail the essence behind the prediction that 
greater examination time may lead to fewer rounds of review. Online Appendix, supra note 9. 
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complex rejections, such as obviousness rejections that include a large 
number of prior art references.110 
As such, there may be some reason to think that prosecution 
costs will go down and some reason to think they will go up by giving 
examiners more time. Accordingly, we attempt to provide empirical 
insight into this question. Our empirical inquiry will consist of two 
parts, each bearing on the points raised in the above conceptual 
discussion: (1) we will explore whether more examination time can 
eliminate some degree of the unproductive back and forth between 
examiners and prosecutors and diminish the number of rounds of 
review (also known as “office actions”) and (2) we will explore whether 
more examination time leads to more complex rejections in a given 
round of review and hence increased per-office-action expenses. 
We test the first question directly. The methodology underlying 
our approach is essentially identical to that employed in Section II.A, 
which discusses litigation savings. In short, that design follows 
examiners throughout promotions that reduce the amount of time they 
have to review applications and observes the impacts of such time-
reducing promotions on the number of rounds of reviews associated 
with the application (all while controlling for other factors that may 
correlate with these promotions and with the various application 
outcomes—e.g., years of examiner experience). In the Online Appendix, 
we further discuss the challenges associated with this exercise and 
some robustness checks that we undertake in the face of these 
challenges.111 All told, this empirical exercise provides no evidence to 
support any claim that greater examination time leads to a greater 
number of rounds of review. In fact, the evidence is consistent with the 
above prediction that greater examination time may lead to fewer 
wasted rounds of review.  
In our preferred specification, we find that doubling examination 
time is associated with 0.56 fewer rounds of review per application, 
 
 110. We note, however, that one may not necessarily expect prosecution costs to increase 
substantially following examiner time increases in that the vast majority of costs of obtaining a 
patent are associated with drafting of the initial application, which are fixed at the time of filing. 
AIPLA 2017 REPORT, supra note 68, at 30–31 (preparing and filing an original application of 
minimal complexity has a median legal charge of $7,000 whereas preparing and filing a response 
to an office action has a median legal charge of $2,000; preparing and filing an original application 
in the field of biotechnology and chemistry has a median legal charge of $10,000 whereas preparing 
and filing a response to an office action has a median legal charge of $3,200; preparing and filing 
an original application in the field of electrical and computer technology has a median legal charge 
of $10,000 whereas preparing and filing a response to an office action has a median legal charge 
of $3,000; preparing and filing an original application in the mechanical field has a median legal 
charge of $8,500 whereas preparing and filing a response to an office action has a median legal 
charge of $2,800). 
111. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 13–18. 
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implying that greater examination time may cut prosecution expenses 
to the extent that greater time leads to less back and forth between 
examiners and applicants. The approximate savings implied by these 
estimates are considerable. To derive these estimated savings, the 
analysis assumes that all rounds of review are of modest complexity, 
parallel to that of mechanical fields, an assumption (per Table 5) that 
suggests a cost of $2,500 per round. In light of (1) this cost, (2) the 
estimated reduction of 0.56 rounds, and (3) the fact that the Patent 
Office disposes of roughly 430,000 applications per year, these elements 
suggest that the patent system may experience upward of $602 million 
savings per year in reduced prosecution expenses in connection with 
doubling examination time. We acknowledge that this aggregate 
estimate assumes that costs per round of review remain flat in 
connection with changes in time allocations. 
It is of course important to look beyond the decreased rounds of 
review and examine whether an expansion in examination time may 
lead to increased costs per round of review. To confront this second 
question, we conduct a simple empirical exercise in which we attempt 
to provide a rough estimate of increased prosecution expenses per office 
action stemming from an increase in time allocations. Should the 
complexity of rejections that prosecutors must respond to increase, it is 
possible that prosecutors would increase their per-office-action fees in 
response. To test this, we exploit the fact that the Patent Office 
increased the time allocations to all patent examiners by two hours in 
2010—representing a roughly 12% increase in time.112 By looking at the 
reported fees charged by patent attorneys for prosecuting patent 
applications immediately before 2010 and then shortly thereafter, we 
can attempt to identify whether an increase in time allocations of this 
magnitude resulted in increased prosecuting fees. The AIPLA reports 
the median charges for patent services every two years based on a 
survey of its members,113 Table 5 reproduces the median attorney’s fees 
associated with responding to a patent examiner’s rejection in 2008, 
2010, and 2012 for a variety of technologies and by complexity of 
application. 
 
 112. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12, at online app. at 2. 
 113. AIPLA 2017 REPORT, supra note 68, at 1. 
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TABLE 5: MEDIAN CHARGES FOR SERVICES:  
U.S. UTILITY PATENTS114 
APPLICATION 
AMENDMENT/ARGUMENT 2008 2010 2012 
Minimal complexity115 $1,850 $1,800 $1,800 
Relatively complex—
biotechnology/chemical $3,200 $3,000 $3,000 
Relatively complex—
electrical/computer $3,000 $3,000 $3,000 
Relatively complex— 
mechanical $2,500 $2,500 $2,500 
 
Notably, the attorney’s fees associated with responding to a 
patent examiner’s rejection stayed flat or decreased from 2008 to 2012. 
Thus, it does not appear that the Patent Office’s 2010 two-hour increase 
in time allocations increased the legal charges associated with 
prosecuting a given round of review. This natural experiment is, of 
course, not perfect. There are certainly other factors that may impact 
the legal charges associated with prosecuting a patent, potentially 
confounding this analysis.116 For instance, changes in the legal market 
(i.e., law firm mergers) or economic conditions could artificially depress 
legal charges associated with prosecuting patents during this time 
period, which may otherwise mask increases in prosecution costs 
stemming from increased examination time. We note, however, that 
median litigation costs for patent infringement were also constant 
during this time period.117 Thus, if one thought that changes in the legal 
market or economic conditions were artificially depressing legal charges 
associated with prosecuting patents during our time of inquiry, then 
one might expect to see corresponding changes in litigation costs for 
patent infringement. Ultimately, this exercise tends to support that an 
 
 114. See id. at 30–31. 
 115.  A “minimal complexity” patent application is defined as an application that has a ten-
page specification and ten claims. Id. at 5.  
 116. It is also possible that attorney’s fees do not scale linearly with the time allocations of 
patent examiners. That is, a modest increase of two hours in time allocations may not result in 
any additional legal charges, but, for instance, doubling the time an examiner spends reviewing a 
patent application could have an impact on attorney’s fees. Even if this is the case, it is important 
to note that the vast majority of the legal costs associated with prosecuting a patent application 
are associated with the initial drafting of the patent application. Id. at 30. 
 117. Id. at 41. 
Wasserman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2019 3:13 PM 
2019] IRRATIONAL IGNORANCE 1013 
increase in examiner time allocations does not lead to notable increases 
in prosecution expenses.118  
Given the limitations of the natural experiment for testing the 
effect of time allocations on costs per round of review119 and given the 
methodological concerns raised in the Online Appendix surrounding the 
estimated 0.56 effect,120 we elect to take a conservative approach and 
heavily discount this $602 million savings estimate. In particular, for 
the purposes of the cost-benefit calculation at the heart of this Article, 
we conservatively assume that these savings are half as large as this 
estimate. As such, this Article proceeds with an estimated savings in 
prosecution costs of $301 million per year. 
C. Other Savings from Investing More in Ex Ante  
Patent Examination 
Section II.A provides estimates of litigation savings—both in 
federal courts and in PTAB challenges—that would result from the 
Patent Office issuing fewer invalid patents in response to doubling 
patent examiner time allocations and Section II.B provides estimates of 
prosecution savings associated with doubling examiner time 
allocations. Of course, invalid patents impose costs on society beyond 
wasteful litigation expenses. Most fundamentally, improvidently 
granted patents can result in supracompetitive pricing due to the 
exclusionary power provided by patent protection. This in turn may 
price individuals out of the relevant market, including individuals that 
would value the product more than the cost of production. While society 
may accept such consequences for a properly issued patent in return for 
the notion that such profits were necessary to induce innovation in the 
first place, an invalid patent imposes these costs on society without 
providing the commensurate benefits.121 For instance, the promise of a 
patent is not needed to induce the development of technology that is not 
new. As such, under proper application of the patentability standards, 
patent applications on such technologies should be denied patent 
protection. 
 
 118. We note that our analysis assumes that practicing attorneys would be able to monetize 
their greater efforts by increasing the legal charges associated with prosecuting patent 
applications. While fixed-fee arrangements may initially dampen efforts to do so, if greater 
examiner time allocations do lead to greater levels of time and effort by applicant’s attorneys, 
increases in fixed-fee levels would be possible over time as new client and/or fee relationships are 
established. 
 119. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text.  
120. Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 5–9. 
 121. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office 
Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817, 817 (2012).  
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Of course, the costs of invalid patents extend beyond those 
simply related to monopoly-driven deadweight losses. Invalid patents 
can also be utilized by non-practicing entities or patent trolls to 
opportunistically extract licensing fees from innovators122 and inhibit 
the ability of startups to obtain venture capital.123 Erroneously issued 
patents can also impede competitors from entering markets124 and stunt 
follow-on research.125 These harms, however, are very difficult to 
quantify.  
Take, for example, follow-on innovation, for which two recent, 
notable papers have provided insight on the effect of patents on 
cumulative innovative efforts.126 Because a given discovery may be 
utilized as an input in later follow-on discoveries, nearly all innovation 
is cumulative in nature. If a patent is issued to an invention that fails 
to meet the patentability standards, the invalid patent could act to 
curtail follow-on efforts by blocking other innovators from using the 
invention associated with the invalid patent as an input to subsequent 
innovation. In the first of these two recent papers, Alberto Galasso and 
Mark Schankerman study the cumulative impacts patents may have on 
innovation by exploring the consequences following the invalidation of 
a patent by a court.127 Under this approach, they find that patents 
impede follow-on innovation but only in very specific scenarios. For 
instance, they find that patent invalidations have a significant impact 
on cumulative innovation only in the fields of computers and 
communications, electronics, and medical instruments (including 
biotechnology)—they find no effect for drugs, chemicals, or mechanical 
technologies.128 Additionally, they show that the effects of patent rights 
 
 122. James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis is Really a Software Patent Crisis, WASH. POST: 
THE SWITCH (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/the-
patent-troll-crisis-is-really-a-software-patent-crisis [https://perma.cc/3RVS-JRJ3] (noting that 
patents are generally overly broad and vaguely worded). 
 123. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 2, at 8 (“The threat of being sued for infringement 
by an incumbent [patent holder]—even on a meritless claim—may ‘scare . . . away’ venture capital 
financing.” (quoting public comment of Joshua Lerner, Professor, Harvard Business School)). 
 124. See id. at 3 (noting that allowing patents on obvious inventions can thwart competition); 
Leslie, supra note 61, at 119–25 (“[A] new entrant concerned about infringing an existing patent 
must pay to investigate the patent’s scope and validity . . . [which poses] a barrier to entry . . . .”). 
 125. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 62, at 698; Scotchmer, supra note 62, at 32 (noting that 
overly broad patent protection “can lead to deficient incentives to develop second generation 
products”). 
126. See Alberto Galasso & Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Casual 
Evidence from the Courts, 130 Q.J. ECON. 317 (2015); Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How 
Do Patents Affect Follow-on Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 21666, 2015), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21666.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V5BQ-SQJQ]. 
 127. Galasso & Schankerman, supra note 126. 
 128. Id. at 321–22.  
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on later innovation depend critically on the characteristics of the 
transacting parties.129 Their entire findings are driven by one specific 
scenario: the number of small innovators increases when patents by 
large firms are invalidated.130 While Galasso and Schankerman provide 
compelling empirical evidence on the heterogeneous nature of patent 
invalidation on cumulative innovation, they are also careful to 
emphasize that their paper involves the judicial removal of an existing 
patent right.131 As they note, there are some conceptual differences 
between this scenario and when patents are never granted in the first 
place, which could limit the generalizability of their findings to the issue 
in this Article—quantifying the potential gains associated with the 
Patent Office issuing fewer invalid patents.132  
In the second of these recent papers, Bhaven Sampat and Heidi 
Williams examine the extent to which patents on human genes affect 
follow-on scientific research and product development.133 Sampat and 
Williams estimate that patents on human genes have largely a 
negligible effect on follow-on innovation, echoing the corresponding 
findings of Galasso and Schankerman in the relevant technological 
area.134 All told, there is some evidence that issuing invalid patents may 
impede future innovative efforts, but this impediment may be limited 
to certain technological fields.  
As such, it is possible that we could reduce some social harms 
related to an inhibition of follow-on innovation to the extent that we 
eliminate invalid patents. Of course, it is critical to keep in mind that 
both the Patent Office and the courts are tasked with eliminating 
invalid patents. Hypothetically speaking, if the courts could 
immediately invalidate all invalid patents issued by the Patent Office, 
society would perhaps not experience any of the hypothesized harms of 
invalid patent issuances (other than the costs of litigation itself). In this 
hypothetical scenario, increasing ex ante review at the Patent Office 
would thus not result in any savings (beyond reduced litigation costs). 
In practice, however, the courts do not operate this perfectly. After all, 
by relying on private enforcement, it is not guaranteed that a litigation 
system will have the opportunity to assess the validity of all invalid 
patents that are issued, especially in light of extensive litigation costs. 
Accordingly, if the courts were to fail to invalidate a patent that is 
 
 129. Id. at 322. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Sampat & Williams, supra note 126.  
 134. Id. (manuscript at 29). 
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substantially impeding follow-on innovation, such harms could indeed 
be saved to the extent that society invested in stronger ex ante review 
at the Patent Office to target these bad patents.  
Courts are also imperfect in their timing. Courts may, at some 
point, get around to invalidating a bad patent; however, notable delay 
may take place before this occurs. In the interim, invalid patents may 
have the opportunity to inflict these various harms on society—e.g., 
stalling follow-on innovation. As such, by investing more at the Patent 
Office and knocking out these invalid patents earlier, we may generate 
additional savings for society.  
Acknowledging the possible mechanisms by which greater ex 
ante investments could reduce the harms associated with invalid 
patents, the question then becomes how large are these harms? And 
how do we quantify them to add to the litigation savings estimates 
discussed in Section II.A and the prosecution savings estimates 
discussed in Section II.B? These are substantial questions in need of 
considerable additional research. While Galasso and Schankerman and 
Sampat and Williams both studied the impacts of patents on follow-on 
innovation, neither attempted to quantify the associated welfare 
impacts. We are also unaware of reliable estimates of the deadweight 
losses associated with patent-induced monopoly pricing, specifically 
during the period of time between patent issuance and court 
invalidation. Given the complexities involved with estimating the 
corresponding savings associated with these other costs, we have 
elected to focus our simulation analysis on the calculations over 
potential savings in litigation, PTAB, and prosecution expenses.  
III. COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASING RESOURCES TO  
THE PATENT OFFICE 
The previous Part calculated the potential savings associated 
with doubling patent examiner time allocations. Of course, this is only 
half of the puzzle. In order to determine whether society would be better 
off devoting more resources to the Patent Office to increase the quality 
of examination, we must also know the costs associated with doubling 
the time examiners review patent applications. This Part turns to this 
task.    
Given the hourly costs of employing examiners, increasing the 
time allocations for reviewing patent applications will result in an 
increase in the average costs associated with evaluating patent 
applications. The overall costs incurred by the Patent Office depend on 
how the Agency responds to its decision to give examiners more time to 
review individual applications. If the Agency’s budget is fixed—i.e., the 
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Patent Office is not able to increase its operating budget in the face of 
a doubling of per-application review time—it would necessarily have to 
reduce the number of applications it processes to ensure its expenses do 
not exceed its revenue. Given that total, Agency spending would not 
change in this scenario. The aggregate social costs associated with this 
approach would largely stem from the harms to patent applicants from 
having to endure longer waiting periods before the Patent Office begins 
examining their applications.135 The costs to the Patent Office itself 
would largely stem from reputational harms associated with having a 
growing backlog of patent applications. Alternatively, if the Patent 
Office could increase its operating budget, then it would maintain its 
examination capacity while concomitantly providing examiners with 
additional time to complete more thorough reviews of all applications. 
Obviously, it would be difficult to do so with its existing workforce given 
the finite number of hours in a day. This alternative scenario thus 
necessarily involves the need to hire an additional group of examiners. 
As a result, the cost to the Patent Office associated with this approach 
is primarily the personnel expenses stemming from the need to hire and 
pay additional patent examiners.  
If the Agency is committed to expanding examination time 
allotments, we suggest that it would prefer the latter to the former for 
several reasons. First, the Agency is under tremendous pressure to 
continue to decrease its voluminous backlog of patent applications.136 
The Patent Office has cut its backlog of patent applications from a high 
of over 760,000 in 2007 to just under 570,000 in 2017.137 Given that the 
Patent Office has identified that its single biggest challenge is to 
decrease its patent pendency—that is, the time between filing a patent 
application and receiving substantive communication regarding its 
 
  135. A backlog of patent applications may impose a variety of costs, including “the reduction 
in value of patent protection for patent applicants; a reduction in the incentive to innovate and 
undertake research and development; granting of monopoly power to non-patentable applications 
(through longer pending patent rights); deterring use of the patent system; and the diversion of 
resources away from productive activities.” LONDON ECON., ECONOMIC STUDY ON PATENT 
BACKLOGS AND A SYSTEM OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION 58 (2010), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-backlog-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET7P-PHRH]. This report estimates that the cost to the global 
economy of one extra year of delays at the United States, European, and Japanese patent offices 
is $7.6 billion. Id. at viii. 
 136. Top Management Challenges Facing the Department of Commerce in FY 2013: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Appropriations Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related 
Agencies, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (statement of Todd Zinser, Inspector Gen. of the U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce) (noting that addressing patent backlog is one of the top challenges facing the 
Department of Commerce). 
 137. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 170 tbl.3. 
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patentability from the Agency138—it seems unlikely that the Agency 
would be inclined to diminish its patent processing capacity. Second, 
the Patent Office has the authority, in effect, to increase its budget 
without having to lobby Congress for additional funds. The Agency is 
user-fee funded and has the ability to set its fees by rulemaking.139 The 
Agency’s budget is generally set to the Patent Office’s projected fee 
income for a given year.140 As a result, by augmenting the fees it charges 
patent applicants, the Patent Office can increase its budget to 
accommodate the additional expenses.141  
Thus, this Article proceeds by assuming the Patent Office would 
choose to maintain its examination production level in the face of 
mounting patent review expenses. Given this assumption, the costs 
associated with increased patent examiner time allocations will 
primarily be the personnel expenses associated with hiring and paying 
additional patent examiners. What are the personnel costs associated 
with doubling the amount of time extended to examiners to review 
applications? To determine these expenses, we conduct a 
 
 138. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 33 (2008), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2008PAR.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8U8P-3NXH] (noting the PTO’s “biggest challenge is to address the growth of 
pendency and the backlog of patent applications waiting to be examined”); Inspector General’s Top 
Management Challenges Facing the USPTO, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://web. 
archive.org/web/20121010172423/http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/oai_01.html (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/J9F7-GMKW] (noting the management challenge of 
reducing the patent application backlog); see also Jon W. Dudas, Message from the Under Secretary 
of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of USPTO: Fighting Piracy and Counterfeiting 
by Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Nov. 2, 2005), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130425173504/http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/ 
2005/02_message_director.jsp [https://perma.cc/DPY4-XWNU] (noting that the “volume and 
complexity of patent applications continues to outpace current capacity to examine them” and the 
PTO has “backlog of historic proportions”). 
 139. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012); Final Rule Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 
4,212, 4,224 tbl.4 (Jan. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §§ 1, 41, 42). Since 1991, the Agency 
has funded its operations almost entirely through user fees. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 1388. The Patent Office’s budget in 1991 was 
over $370 million, of which $3 million were from general revenue funds. U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 97, at 1–2.  
 Of course, alternatively, the Patent Office could lobby Congress to increase its budget through 
funding the Agency in part through tax revenues. However, mounting concern regarding deficit 
containment as well as Congress’s past track record of utilizing the Patent Office’s fees to fund 
other governmental activities (even when the Agency’s financial sustainability was in question) 
suggests this is unlikely to be successful.  
 140. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect 
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67, 
76–77 (2013). 
 141. Id. at 76–80 (describing the Patent Office’s budgetary process). Moreover, the limitation 
that the Agency can only set its fees so that, in the aggregate, its fees cover its expenses would in 
no way limit the Agency’s ability to modify its fees to cover the additional examination expenses. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (codifying patent fees). 
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straightforward accounting exercise in Table 6. We begin by considering 
the 430,056 regular utility applications142 disposed of by the Patent 
Office in 2016, breaking down those applications into the GS-levels of 
the associated examiners. In light of the average number of hours 
allocated to the various GS-levels, we then determine for each GS-level 
the number of additional hours the Agency would need to fund in order 
to double the amount of time extended to each application. We then 
multiply these hours by the costs per hour to employ patent examiners 
at the various GS-levels. Where such costs account for the relevant 
salary at that GS-level in addition to a range of related costs—such as 
fringe benefits, office expenses, and equipment—we make various 
conservative assumptions to account for these supplementary 
expenses.143 Overall, using 2016 figures, this exercise suggests that 
 
 142. By “regular,” we mean excluding provisional applications and applications filed under the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty. 
 143. To determine the hourly costs, we start by considering hourly salaries across GS-levels 
(beginning with GS-level 5) from 2016. General Schedule (GS) Payscale Table for 2016, 
FEDERALPAY.ORG, https://www.federalpay.org/gs/2016 (last visited Jan. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
X6ES-QCV7]. Of course, the full cost of an employee to an organization exceeds their base salary. 
Account must be made for fringe benefits, employer taxes and insurance, and allotments for office 
space, rent, equipment, replacement and turnover costs, managerial support, and other such costs. 
The Patent Office does not report these costs for a marginal employee hour. Nonetheless, we 
researched accounting practices for determining the indirect costs of employee time for 
organizations that we thought would be comparable in nature (in terms of employee tasks) to the 
Patent Office—i.e., organizations contracting with the federal government where such 
organizations need to account for the costs of employee effort to be able to develop governmental 
bids. Deltek surveys government contracting agencies for these purposes and reports average 
indirect costs in a recent study. See DELTEK CLARITY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING INDUSTRY 
STUDY (2018), http://more.deltek.com/gc-clarity-2018?sourceid=19&utm_source=blogs&utm_ 
medium=website&utm_campaign=GovConBlog&cmp=website_blogs_ClarityGovConToplineResu
lts [https://perma.cc/643K-DSTG]. Deltek reports average fringe-benefit costs of twenty-eight 
percent, average general and administrative expense rates of fifteen percent, and an average 
composite overhead expense rate of thirty-nine percent. Id. at 26. These numbers imply that the 
full cost of employee time is roughly 2.04 times (1.28 × 1.15 × 1.39) an employee’s base salary. See 
id.; see also Hyam Singer, Don’t Be Fooled: Calculate the Real Cost of Employees and  
Consultants, TOPTAL, https://www.toptal.com/freelance/don-t-be-fooled-the-real-cost-of-employees-
and-consultants (last visited Jan. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/TR4R-SBRF] (calculating a multiple 
of 1.99 based on a prior Deltek report). There may be reason to believe that the relevant multiplier 
in the case of the Patent Office is lower than this amount. After all, the vast majority of patent 
examiners employed by the Agency telecommute from their homes, saving considerable overhead 
costs. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 1, at 91, 94. Nonetheless, to be conservative, 
we select a multiplier implied by the Deltek averages.  
 The Patent Office conducted a regulatory impact analysis with respect to rulemaking to set 
and adjust patent fees that are economically significant in 2013. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: SETTING AND ADJUSTING PATENT FEES IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH SECTION 10 OF THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT (Jan. 18, 2013), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/AC54_Final_Regulatory_Impact_An
alysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4ZX-D9N5]. In this analysis, the Agency estimated that hiring 1,500 
additional patent examiners would cost the Patent Office $154 million in terms of “long-term cost 
of compensation and benefits in the out years.” Id. at 53. This would suggest a multiplier of 
approximately 1.3, assuming the distribution of patent examiners in Table 6.  
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doubling the amount of time extended to examiners will cost the Agency 
$660 million per year.  
TABLE 6: SIMULATED INCREASE IN PAYROLL EXPENSES ASSOCIATED 
WITH DOUBLING THE NUMBER OF HOURS ALLOCATED TO EXAMINERS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GS-level 
Number of 
Annual 
Dispositions 
by 
Examiners 
Mean 
Number 
of Hours 
Assigned 
Total 
Additional 
Hours After 
Doubling 
Hours per 
Application 
Examiner 
Cost per 
Hour (Salary, 
Benefits, and 
Other Costs) 
Extra Costs 
When Doubling 
Examination 
Hours 
GS-5 237 36.3 8,603 $31.41 $270,200 
GS-7 3,244 28.7 93,103 $38.90 $3,621,325 
GS-9 9,870 26.0 256.620 $47.57 $12,207,762 
GS-11 20,770 23.5 488,095 $57.58 $28,102,895 
GS-12 41,825 21.5 899,238 $68.99 $62,041,828 
GS-13 85,747 18.2 1,560,595 $82.05 $128,043,432 
GS-14 254,931 16.3 4,155,375 $96.96 $402,920,694 
GS-15 12,432 16.5 205,128 $114.05 $23,394,541 
Total 430,056 17.9 7,666,757 $76.58 $660,602,677 
The mean number of hours per GS-level is calculated over the 2016 Patent 
Application Information Retrieval (“PAIR”) sample after assigning hour allotments 
to each application in the PAIR database based on the associated technology group 
and examiner GS-level. 
IV. THE PATENT OFFICE IS IRRATIONALLY IGNORANT 
This Part summarizes our empirical findings from Parts II and 
III and compares the potential savings and costs associated with 
doubling patent examiner time allocations. Because the litigation and 
prosecution savings associated with increasing the Patent Office 
resources outweigh the costs associated with increasing the examiner’s 
time allocations, we conclude that society would be better off investing 
more resources ex ante in the review of patent applications. That is to 
say, we conclude the opposite of Lemley. Given its current level of 
resources, the Patent Office is not being “rationally ignorant” but, 
instead, irrationally ignorant. This Part closes by outlining the key 
differences between our findings and Lemley’s, noting that Lemley’s 
assumptions understated the potential savings and overstated the 
potential costs associated with doubling patent examiner time 
allocations.  
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A. The Patent Office Resources Should Be Increased 
To summarize our empirical analysis, we simulate that by 
doubling the amount of hours allocated to review applications, the 
amount of additional costs to the Agency will be roughly $660 million 
annually. We estimate federal litigation savings of $491 million and 
PTAB litigation savings of $112 million. We also estimate that 
increasing examiner time allocations will result in $301 million in 
savings in prosecution expenses to the patent applicant, driven by 
decreased rounds of reviews at the Patent Office. Though the $660 
million increase in costs is significant, this amount is still exceeded by 
the $904 million that may be saved annually in (1) expenses covering 
litigation in federal court, (2) PTAB-related legal expenses, and 
(3) potential savings in prosecution costs.144  
Moreover, this excess of savings over costs would only grow if we 
were able to quantify what are likely to be substantial additional social 
costs stemming from the issuance of invalid patents that will either 
never be invalidated in court or that will be invalidated with a delay. 
The conservative nature of our comparison strategy is only 
strengthened by our decision to exclude these additional savings from 
our direct comparison.145  
Lemley famously noted that the Patent Office is “rationally 
ignorant.”146 Based on the above empirical analysis, we do not agree 
with Lemley’s contention that the present state of affairs is “rational.” 
On the contrary, the present degree of ignorance—that is, the limited 
ability of examiners to unearth prior art and hence reject patent 
applications that fail to meet the patentability standards—is irrational. 
In other words, the current level of resources the Patent Office extends 
to review patent applications is insufficient.  
 
 144. See supra Part II. 
 145. Quantifying those additional savings would become more critical if the increased 
expenses associated with augmenting patent examiner time allocations were greater than the 
saved litigation expenses.  
 146. See Lemley, supra note 3. By “ignorant,” he referred to the inability of examiners, at least 
in some cases, to fully apply the patentability requirements during the limited time they were 
allotted for review—e.g., their inability to discover that a claimed innovation was not, in fact, 
novel. Id. at 1508–09. When looking at the present structure of the examination process, we do not 
necessarily take issue with Lemley’s use of the term “ignorant.” Patent examiners indeed appear 
to be allowing a notable degree of patents that would likely fail a stricter examination if examiners 
were given greater resources.  
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B. Key Differences Between Our Findings and Lemley’s 
This Section delineates how we reach the opposite outcome than 
Lemley. More specifically, we find that Lemley overstated the costs 
associated with increasing patent examiner time allocations and 
understated the savings associated with augmenting the time 
examiners review patents.  
First, Lemley assumed that if the amount of time patent 
examiners spent reviewing an application was doubled, the Patent 
Office would issue ten percent fewer patents.147 Based on that 
assumption, Lemley then assumed that litigation costs would decrease 
by ten percent if the time allocations of patent examiners were 
doubled.148 Unlike Lemley, we do not simply guess a particular value 
for these parameters. Rather, we draw on rich microlevel application 
data and estimate an empirical model meant to isolate the relationship 
between examination time allotments on the one hand and either grant 
rates or reduced litigation events on the other hand. To be clear, our 
analysis is not without assumptions of its own. Virtually no empirical 
exercise could escape such a requirement. In our case, as we 
exhaustively discuss and support in our prior peer-reviewed research 
that developed these methods,149 we are assuming that the comparisons 
of outcomes across applications assigned to examiners at different GS-
levels indeed illuminate the effects of varying time allocations to 
examiners (after accounting for the range of controls included in the 
regression specification). We acknowledge that there is still room to 
challenge our assumption in this regard; nonetheless, we have 
endeavored with this exercise to go far beyond merely assuming the 
value of the key parameter itself.  
Ultimately, but perhaps not surprisingly, our estimation 
approach delivers a different value for these parameters than those 
assumed by Lemley. In particular, our analysis suggests that both of 
Lemley’s assumed values are too low, thus downplaying the total 
potential savings from greater ex ante investment in examination 
review. To begin, as set forth in the Online Appendix and as 
summarized in Section II.A.2, by doubling the amount of examination 
hours, we predict that patent grant rates will fall by roughly 27%, not 
10%, as Lemley assumed.150 For the reasons theorized above, this 
reduction in patent issuances would be expected to lead to less 
 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 1509–10.  
149. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 12. 
150. See Online Appendix, supra note 9, at 4–9; see also supra Section II.A.2. 
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subsequent litigation. It is also important to note that greater 
examination time may improve issued patent quality in ways that are 
not solely captured by a reduced grant rate—e.g., greater time may also 
help examiners narrow the claim scope of patents that would have 
issued either way. Perhaps due to a combination of these claim-
narrowing effects and the reduced-patent-issuance effects, our 
regression estimates demonstrate that a doubling of examination time 
for a given application leads to a 44% reduction in the expected 
litigation expenses associated with that application.  
This litigation-savings estimate is considerably larger than the 
ten percent effect assumed by Lemley, and that difference holds 
meaningful implications for our ultimate conclusion. If we were to 
replicate the litigation savings from Table 3 but use Lemley’s 
assumptions, we would predict that the amount of federal litigation 
savings would equal only $147 million (discounted to $126 million). This 
amount, even when combined with the PTAB and prosecution savings, 
would no longer exceed the $660 million in necessary additional 
expenditures associated with doubling examination time. Thus, at least 
when focusing on our comparison of institutional costs—litigation, 
PTAB, and prosecution savings versus agency administrative 
expenses—we reach a different conclusion from Lemley, in part, due to 
our ability to actually estimate the degree of litigation savings ensuing 
from a doubling of examination hours. 
Another notable difference between our calculation and 
Lemley’s stems from differences in our respective estimates of the effect 
of augmenting examiner time allocations on patent prosecution legal 
charges. Lemley assumed (without estimating) that doubling the time 
examiners review patent applications will result in a fifty percent 
increase in legal fees associated with prosecuting patents.151 He 
reasoned that because patent examiners will have more time for review, 
they will find more prior art and make more rejections, in which event 
the responding attorney will need to spend more time reviewing and 
responding to the additional rejections.152 Lemley set the costs 
associated with prosecuting an original patent application at $20,000 
(and a repeat-filed application at $5,000), meaning that for each 
original application filed it would cost $10,000 more to prosecute (and 
for a repeat-filed application, an additional $2,500).153 Because 
currently over 430,000 applications are disposed of annually, of which 
 
 151. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1508.  
 152. Id. at 1508 n.7. 
 153. Id. at 1508. 
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approximately 40% are repeat filers,154 the increased legal charges 
associated with doubling time allocations under Lemley’s assumption 
are just over $3 billion (assuming no inflation in prosecution costs).155 
If Lemley’s assumption regarding prosecution costs is correct, then our 
ultimate conclusion would change. But we believe that this amount 
vastly overestimates the increased legal fees associated with 
augmenting patent examiner time allocations. In fact, our estimate 
suggests these fees are in the wrong direction altogether.  
Although we agree that examiners may make higher-quality 
rejections if given more time to review patent applications, as discussed 
in Section II.B, it is theoretically unclear whether this would increase 
or decrease the aggregate legal fees associated with prosecuting 
patents. The empirical evidence set forth in Section II.B suggests a 
large potential savings in these fees. More specifically, we find there is 
little change in per-office-action fees resulting from an increase in time 
allocations, lending little support to the supposition that prosecution 
rates would increase. Most saliently, our findings that the number of 
rounds of review would likely decrease upon augmenting examiner time 
allocations supports the notion that patent applicants could experience 
substantial savings—not costs—due to stronger ex ante investment in 
the Patent Office. In particular, we estimate that doubling examiner 
time allocations would result in a $301 million savings to patent 
prosecution legal fees. 
V. OBJECTIONS  
This Part begins by addressing objections to the calculations laid 
out in Parts II through IV. Some might question the costs and savings 
 
 154. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 7, at 627 (noting that forty percent of applications filed 
in 2012 were repeat filings).  
 155. Technically, Lemley assumed patent application filings would decrease by ten percent in 
response to enhanced examination at the Patent Office. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1509. Thus, his 
estimated prosecution costs would be $2.7 billion, not $3 billion. See id. Either way, if Lemley’s 
assumption regarding increased prosecution costs is correct, our ultimate conclusion would be 
altered.  
 On this point, in our own estimates of the amount of litigation savings and additional personnel 
expenses stemming from doubling examination hours, we do not assume that the number of 
annual dispositions will fall as a result of additional ex ante investment in the Patent Office. What 
if we were to assume, as Lemley did, that applications will fall by ten percent in the process? First, 
recall that the number of annual application dispositions by the Patent Office is a key direct input 
into our estimates of both the costs and savings of investing more in the Patent Office, as discussed 
in Parts II and III. Scaling that input down by ten percent will, in turn, scale down both sides of 
our fundamental comparison. Accordingly, this assumption will only affect the size of the 
differential between costs and savings that we predict, not the direction of that differential. 
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we choose to incorporate while others might argue that the focus on 
legal costs fails to account for distributional effects.  
A. Failure to Account for a Full Range of Costs and Benefits 
We do not, and cannot possibly, account for all the costs and 
savings associated with increasing patent examiner review times. We 
noted this previously when indicating our inability to quantify the 
additional savings that may arise from reduced deadweight losses from 
monopoly pricing, reduced harms to follow-on innovation, and other 
such factors. Given the lack of relevant empirical data on these other 
savings, we have chosen to take a conservative approach by considering 
only litigation and prosecution savings. In contrast, the estimate of 
costs associated with increasing examiner time allocations is more 
comprehensive and more likely to include the full range of costs. Our 
limited ability to consider potential savings does not affect our 
conclusion that the Patent Office is irrationally ignorant. If the 
litigation and prosecution savings alone justify spending more 
resources at the Patent Office, considering the full range of savings 
would only make the case more compelling.  
Although we are more confident that our estimation of potential 
costs is more comprehensive than our estimation of potential savings, 
admittedly, we, like Lemley, only consider first-order costs and savings 
associated with increasing examiner time allocations. There are 
undoubtedly second-order costs and savings associated with giving 
examiners more time to do their jobs. By second-order, we refer to 
subsequent effects that may arise in response to the effects of time-
allocation increases already discussed.  
Many second-order effects, however, are difficult to quantify 
even with empirical guidance. For instance, the Patent Office may need 
to increase its fees in an effort to fund the increased personnel expenses 
set forth in Part III. Higher examination fees could result in the filing 
of fewer patent applications. On the one hand, fewer filings could be a 
reflection of less underlying innovation. The added cost associated with 
receiving a patent on a new invention—as a result of the heightened 
fees—may induce an innovator to forgo pursuing that invention in the 
first place. On the other hand, it may be the case that the foregone 
invention is of dubious legal merit anyway—e.g., perhaps what is 
foregone are efforts to develop a technology that is already known to the 
world. To the extent that increased Patent Office fees discourage 
innovative efforts of this more dubious nature, the result may be one 
that enhances social welfare. There is some support from economic 
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theory that increases in fees would first impact these less 
groundbreaking innovations.156 
Other secondary effects are even more difficult to quantify. For 
instance, companies sued for patent litigation must often involve 
scientists and researchers in their litigation efforts—e.g., to participate 
in depositions and to provide litigation support—which can crowd out 
their research and development efforts.157 Of course, while these 
research-related effects may be difficult to quantify, were we to 
incorporate them, it would only increase our estimated savings levels 
and thus reinforce our analysis. Alternatively but relatedly, the costs 
associated with hiring additional patent examiners could be larger than 
we suggested. Because a scientific degree is necessary to become a 
patent examiner, examiners are almost always trained scientists and 
engineers. Is society better off placing scientists in private companies 
to work on innovations or in the Patent Office to review applications?  
This is a difficult question, which, at least today, is nearly 
impossible to answer.158 Nonetheless, given the litany of conservative 
assumptions we have made along the way and the theoretical ambiguity 
as to whether these second-order considerations will increase or 
decrease the net savings to society, we have little reason to believe that 
 
 156. Mark Schankerman & Florian Schuett, Screening for Patent Quality: Examination, Fees, 
and the Courts (Tilburg Law & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2016-036, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885197 [https://perma.cc/7M2Z-GR75].  
 As a result, if we were to incorporate a consideration of the effect of Patent Office fee changes 
into our cost-benefit analysis, the result could either strengthen or weaken our ultimate 
conclusion. Nonetheless, studies to date have suggested that small increases to patent-
examination fees have a negligible effect on the volume of patent filings. See Gaetan de 
Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, On the Price Elasticity of Demand for 
Patents, 74 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 58, 58–77 (2011); Timothy K. Wilson, Patent Demand—
A Simple Path to Patent Reform, 2 INT’L IN-HOUSE COUNSEL J. 806, 810–12 (2008) (arguing that 
filing fees need to be raised significantly in order to reach the elastic portion of the demand curve). 
Accordingly, even if fee levels increased to accommodate the required personnel expenses, it is not 
clear that we would see a meaningful change in applicant behavior in the first place. Given this 
empirical insight from the existing literature on the elasticity of applicant behavior to fee levels, 
we have elected not to model these effects altogether. 
 157. Stephen Kiebzak, Greg Rafert & Catherine E. Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and 
Patent Assertion Entities on Entrepreneurial Activity (June 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457611 [https://perma.cc/2JWL-TGVH] 
(finding a U-shaped relationship between U.S. venture capital investment and the number of 
litigated patents).  
 158. Despite this difficulty, we acknowledge the possibility of observing productivity and/or 
innovation declines elsewhere in society as a result of increasing the Patent Office workforce. But 
it is important to keep in mind that by expanding the personnel capacity of the Patent Office, we 
are likely to improve the quality and the efficiency of the patent examination process. This may 
only increase the returns to patenting and to innovative activity, which may, in turn, attract more 
individuals into science and research in the first place. Given both the theoretical ambiguity in the 
direction of any such effect and the difficulty in estimating these responses, we accordingly do not 
incorporate them into our cost-benefit comparison.  
Wasserman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 4/28/2019 3:13 PM 
2019] IRRATIONAL IGNORANCE 1027 
our failure to account for these second-order effects will alter the 
ultimate implications of our analysis.159 
B. Distributional Effects 
This Article has not yet discussed any distributional 
considerations associated with the fundamental question of whether we 
should rely more on ex ante screening or ex post litigation for patent 
invalidation purposes. Stated more generally, we have not yet 
addressed the question of who in society should bear the marginal costs 
associated with screening valid from invalid patents. The costs involved 
are, of course, not trivial, and the benefits that derive from the 
screening of valid from invalid patents are felt by the general public. 
For both of these reasons, it may enhance both equity and efficiency if 
the costs associated with screening invalid patents were to be spread 
across a large base, rather than being concentrated on a small group of 
individuals in society.160 
 
 159. Moreover, even if we were to double the number of examiners at the Patent Office, this 
would only entail the hiring of an additional eight thousand individuals. This is perhaps trivial 
next to the size of the overall workforce employed as either scientists or engineers in the United 
States. For instance, consider the number of people employed in the following positions in the 
United States in 2016: chemical engineers (32,700), electrical and electronics engineers (324,600), 
civil engineers (303,500), mechanical engineers (288,800), industrial engineers (257,900), 
environmental engineers (53,800), computer hardware engineers (73,600), nuclear engineers 
(17,700), petroleum engineers (33,700), aerospace engineers (69,600), biomedical engineers 
(21,300), medical scientists (120,000), biochemists and biophysicists (31,500), microbiologists 
(23,200), agricultural and food scientists (43,000), computer and information research scientists 
(27,900), chemists and materials scientists (96,200), environmental scientists and specialists 
(89,500), geoscientists (32,000), physicists and astronomers (19,900), and atmospheric scientists 
(10,400), among others. For these statistics and more information regarding workforce size, see 
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 
https://www.bls.gov/ooh (last modified April 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CE69-57RX].  
 160. Basic economic theory suggests that, generally, the more one loads the financing of a 
public good onto one source—e.g., through taxation—the higher the extent of deadweight losses 
stemming from the necessary taxation. It is generally more efficient to spread those financing 
burdens more broadly. See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 204–08 (5th 
ed. 1993). Moreover, this outcome would likely align with considerations of equity to the extent 
that we see a greater correspondence between the group of individuals benefiting from this policy 
and the group of individuals financing this policy.  
 An assumption that we have made thus far in this discussion is that the public at large is 
indeed the group that benefits from a proper screening of valid from invalid patents. But is that 
assumption altogether clear? After all, it is undeniable that patent owners are the primary 
beneficiaries of obtaining a patent. They may be able to charge monopoly prices for their invention, 
reaping significant rents during the period of the exclusivity. At the same time, the patent system’s 
primary goal is to promote innovation, and society, not just the patent applicant, benefits from the 
fruits of such innovation. Without a mechanism such as the patent system to recoup their research 
and development expenses, innovators may choose not to innovate at all, which would be 
unquestionably bad for society. Moreover, once this system is in place, society at large stands to 
lose should patent protection be extended to invalid patents, in which event society gains from 
investing greater resources to ensure that these determinations are made accurately. 
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One might be concerned that adopting the ex ante approach 
would too narrowly focus the costs of screening invalid patents on 
patent applicants. However, it may be premature to conclude that the 
costs of greater ex ante investment are actually concentrated on a 
smaller section of society. First, all applicants pay application (and 
other) fees to the Patent Office, whereas only a small subset of those 
innovators will ultimately be involved in litigation. Moreover, the full 
incidence of application fees may fall on a much broader base—i.e., 
patent holders may pass those costs onto their customers via higher 
prices. Finally, even if it were the case that the full incidence of the fees 
paid to the Agency did not sufficiently fall on a broad enough portion of 
the population, it is also important to note that a push toward greater 
ex ante investment at the Patent Office could also be combined with a 
retreat from full user-fee funding of the Patent Office. That is, one could 
fund some amount of the additional personnel expenses needed to 
expand examination time through general tax revenue—which would 
be directly spread across a wide base—rather than user fees.161 
All told, it is simply unclear whether one approach—ex ante 
versus ex post—trumps the other from a distributional point of view. 
Accordingly, even though the analysis in Parts II through IV largely 
focuses on a comparison of aggregate costs and aggregate savings, we 
do not believe that a consideration of distributional factors of this 
nature would fundamentally alter our contention that society would 
benefit from investment in greater resources devoted to patent 
examination at the Patent Office.  
VI. REFORM PROPOSALS 
So far, this Article has focused on whether it is more efficient to 
increase the time examiners spend reviewing patent applications to 
weed out more bad patents or to reserve a larger role for the courts to 
invalidate improvidently issued patents. We conclude that the Patent 
Office should give serious thought to augmenting the time allocations 
of patent examiners given that Part IV demonstrated that the benefits 
 
 161. Congress, however, would have to provide the Patent Office with a sufficient budget to 
cover its growing examination demands, which is hardly a given. In the past, Congress has 
routinely utilized Patent Office fees to fund other governmental activities, even when the Agency’s 
resource health was in question. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 140, at 77–78. Furthermore, 
mounting concerns over the federal government’s fiscal cliff suggest that funding the Agency 
through taxes may not result in the Patent Office receiving sufficient resources to process its 
growing backlog of patent applications. One of the primary drivers behind Congress’s increased 
reliance on user fees to finance agencies has been the belief that such a funding mechanism 
increases the resource sustainability of the Agency, especially in the current environment of deficit 
containment. 
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associated with increasing the time examiners evaluate applications 
outweigh the costs. This Part provides some specifics as to how the 
Agency should augment examiner time allocations.  
There is a question, of course, as to how the Agency should go 
about augmenting review time. Should examiners be given more time 
across the board, or should the Patent Office enact a more nuanced 
approach? That is, while expanding time allotments, should we also 
reconsider the manner in which those allotments vary over an 
examiner’s career? We argue for the latter. Instead of advocating that 
the Agency should give all examiners a set increase in hours for review, 
we suggest that the Agency should target its time expansion efforts 
more heavily on higher GS-level examiners.  
As discussed in Section I.A, our previous work found that 
examiner grant rates increase by roughly 13% to 29% as an examiner 
rises from GS-level 7 to GS-level 14, a progression wherein examination 
times are cut in half. While decreasing hour allotments upon promotion 
is prudent—after all, seasoned and proven examiners are likely to 
complete a review of an application faster than an examiner who has 
yet to demonstrate this competency—our prior research suggests the 
rate at which the Patent Office decreases time allocations upon 
examiner promotion should be reconsidered.162 Our estimates of 
significantly higher grant rates upon reaching higher GS-levels suggest 
that the current scaling of the time allotments upon promotion is too 
aggressive and leaves applicants with an inequitable outcome. 
Applicants that, by chance, happen to receive an examiner with an 
aggressive time schedule (i.e., a higher GS-level), will face a much 
higher likelihood of success relative to applicants that, by chance, 
happen to receive an examiner with a more forgiving schedule.  
As a result, we propose that the Patent Office not only give all 
examiners more time to review patent applications but that the Agency 
target those time expansions more heavily on the higher GS-level 
examiners. In other words, the time allocations of a GS-level 12 patent 
examiner reviewing applications in a given technology should be 
increased more than the time allocations of a GS-level 11 patent 
examiner reviewing applications in the same technology. Increasing 
examiner time allocations will help improve the quality of patents 
issued by the Agency. To the extent that these adjustments will create 
a more homogenous pattern of grant rates across examiners, such a 
change would increase the equity of the patent examination system, as 
similar applicants would be more likely to have similar patent office 
outcomes. 
 
162. See supra Section I.A. 
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Finally, we note that this analysis does not speak to whether 
other proposals to improve Patent Office decisionmaking should be 
implemented. For instance, our prior work argued that the Agency’s fee 
schedule should be modified to eliminate a financial incentive to grant 
patents.163 Others have proposed Patent Office reforms to increase the 
clarity of issued claims.164 Still others, including us, have suggested 
limiting the number of times a patent applicant can refile the same 
application.165 These suggestions may be good ideas, but a separate 
cost-benefit analysis must be conducted before concluding as such.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article confronts a classic regulatory dilemma: Should 
society increase the resources at the Patent Office in an effort to 
increase the quality of issued patents, or should society reserve a larger 
residual role for the courts to invalidate bad patents? Mark Lemley 
famously favored the latter, arguing that the costs associated with 
increasing examiner time allocations outweighed the benefits of doing 
so. This Article conducts a similar cost-benefit analysis to the one that 
Lemley attempted over fifteen years ago, but does so by employing new 
and rich sources of data along with sophisticated empirical techniques 
to form novel, empirically driven estimates of relationships that Lemley 
was forced, given the dearth of empirical evidence at the time, to simply 
assume in his own analysis. Armed with these new estimates, this 
Article demonstrates that the savings associated with giving examiners 
additional time per application outweigh the costs of doing so. We thus 
conclude that given its current level of resources, the Patent Office is 
not being “rationally ignorant” but, instead, irrationally ignorant.  
 
 
 163. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 140, at 76–80. 
 164. See Peter S. Menell & Michael M. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 33–34 (2013) (describing a “wish list” of recommendations that would clarify 
the claims process, such as requiring applicants to designate a default dictionary); Peter S. Menell, 
Promoting Patent Claim Clarity, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (May 10, 2016), http://btlj.org/2016/ 
05/promoting-patent-claim-clarity [https://perma.cc/2YZQ-4J3J] (suggesting the use of a patent 
claim template).  
 165. See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 7, at 672 (arguing to limit the number of repeat 
applications an applicant can file in an effort to abolish a pro-granting bias at the Patent Office); 
Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63 
(2004) (arguing to limit the number of repeat filings). 
